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21. Introduction
The view that bankers’ compensation created the incentives that led to the latest financial
crisis has prompted numerous proposals to regulate pay at financial institutions.1 However,
despite the attention devoted to executive pay by regulators, extant research provides
mixed support for the hypothesis that CEO compensation in the run-up to the crisis
influenced bank risk taking. Thus, although some authors, such as DeYoung et al. (2013),
find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking incentives and bank risk or policy choices,
others find no such relation. Notably, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find no significant
relation between the most commonly used measure of the risk-taking incentives generated
by executive compensation (vega) and bank performance during the crisis.
In this paper, we argue that standard measures of the risk-taking incentives generated
by executive compensation, which focus on the incentives generated by stock options, do
not capture a potentially large component of bank CEOs’ incentives to take on risk, namely
the incentives generated by their stock holdings. Indeed, because of limited liability, equity
holders have the incentive to shift risk to debtholders and other claim holders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Galai and Masulis, 1976), and this incentive is especially strong for the
equity holders of highly levered firms, such as large U.S. financial institutions. Therefore,
we test the hypothesis that a greater sensitivity of a CEO’s wealth to his firm’s stock
price (delta), by aligning the CEO’s incentives with those of shareholders, will increase
the CEO’s risk-taking incentives in highly levered banks but not, or to a lesser degree, in
banks with low leverage.
To investigate the relation between CEO risk-taking incentives prior to the financial
crisis and risk, we use failure during the crisis period (2007–2010) as the measure of firm
risk. We measure risk ex post to capture the tail risk that is unlikely to be captured by
standard risk measures if they are computed prior to the crisis (as in Cheng et al., 2015
or DeYoung et al., 2013). To account for the possibility that regulators may intervene to
prevent the default of some banks by brokering their acquisition by healthier ones, we
use an encompassing definition of bank failure that includes not only closures but also ac-
quisitions of distressed banks with the intervention of supervisors. As a case in point, on
March 16, 2008, Bear Stearns agreed to be acquired by JPMorgan for $2 per share, which
represented a more than 90% discount relative to the previous closing price (although
the acquisition price was subsequently raised to $10 per share). The Federal Reserve bro-
kered the deal and provided financial assistance by funding the purchase of Bear Stearns’
1 Section 956 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires that the banking agencies regulate
compensation arrangements at large financial institutions to discourage inappropriate risk
taking, and, in 2011 and 2016, the agencies proposed rules to regulate pay in financial
institutions. Outside of the United States, regulatory action has been intense as well.
The European Union approved directives CRD III (in 2010) and CRD IV (in 2013), which
contain provisions that regulate compensation at financial institutions, and the Committee
of European Banking Supervisors (in 2010) and the European Banking Authority (in 2015)
issued guidelines on sound remuneration policies. In the United Kingdom, the Financial
Services Authority issued in 2009, and amended in 2010, the so-called Remuneration Code,
and the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority issued
remuneration rules for financial firms in 2015. At the multinational level, the Financial
Stability Forum issued the Principles for Sound Compensation Practices in 2009.
3troubled assets. Although Bear Stearns did not default, our measure considers it a failed
financial institution.
We estimate the relation between risk-taking incentives measured in year 2006 and
bank failure in the period 2007-2010 for a sample of large U.S. financial institutions.
Our results show that, whereas a higher delta is associated with a significantly higher
(both statistically and economically) probability of failure in highly levered firms, it does
not have a significant relation with the probability of failure in less levered firms. In
line with the findings of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we find no significant relation
between bank failure and the sensitivity of the value of CEOs’ stock option portfolios to
the volatility of their firms’ stock (vega). The results are robust to the use of different sets
of control variables, specifications, or subsamples. They also hold, albeit in weaker form, if
we measure bank risk by means of distance to default, the corresponding expected default
frequency, buy-and-hold returns, market beta, or stock price volatility, measured during
the financial crisis. Therefore, our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the risk-
taking incentives generated by CEO compensation influenced firm risk among financial
firms, although we also discuss alternative non-causal explanations for our findings.
We also estimate the relation between compensation incentives, leverage, and risk in
the periods before (2003-2006) and after (2011-2014) the crisis. In these periods, firm
failures are too infrequent among the relatively large listed firms in our sample to be used
as a measure of risk, so we use, instead, the measures of distance to default and expected
default frequency proposed by Bharath and Shumway (2008) as alternative measures of
the risk of failure. The results for the periods outside the crisis are weaker, but generally in
line with the ones we find during the financial crisis. We interpret our results as suggesting
that risk measures computed in normal times do not incorporate financial firms’ exposure
to correlated tail risk.
In addition to the work by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and DeYoung et al. (2013)
cited above, several articles have analyzed the relation between CEO compensation and
bank risk in the wake of the financial crisis. Gande and Kalpathy (2015) show that vega
before the crisis is positively associated with the amount of U.S. Federal Reserve emergency
loans provided to banks, which they use as an ex post measure of bank risk. Bhagat and
Bolton (2014) examine the net payoff obtained by the CEOs of 14 of the largest U.S.
financial institutions during the period from 2000 to 2008, as well as CEOs’ trades of their
own stock during the same period, and conclude that CEO compensation in those firms
generated incentives for excessive risk taking. Bennett et al. (2015) and Brown et al. (2015)
focus on different components of CEO compensation: Bennett et al. (2015) find a negative
relation between bank CEOs’ debt-like compensation (inside debt) and bank risk during
the financial crisis, and Brown et al. (2015) show that severance pay is related to bank
risk. Cheng et al. (2015) put forth an alternative explanation of the relation between CEO
compensation and bank risk, in which banks’ exogenously-given riskiness determines the
(optimal) CEO compensation, and find results consistent with their proposed explanation.
Finally, Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) and Bebchuk et al. (2010) analyze case studies of
executive compensation at large U.S. financial institutions and propose compensation
reforms.2 Our main contribution to this literature is that we propose and find support for
2 There are some earlier studies of the relation between CEO compensation and bank risk
taking, notably Houston and James (1995) and John and Qian (2003). Laeven and Levine
(2009) and Erkens et al. (2012) also analyze the relation between bank governance and
bank risk for international samples of large financial institutions.
4the hypothesis that the compensation of bank CEOs generates risk-taking incentives, but
the sign and strength of those incentives depend on bank leverage. Our contribution is
complementary to recent ones by Anderson and Core (2015) and Chesney et al. (2012),
who also highlight the fact that equity holdings may generate incentives to take on risk
in highly levered firms. These authors propose structural valuation models to obtain a
measure of the sensitivity of the value of CEOs’ equity holdings to the volatility of the
firm’s assets and, in the case of Chesney et al. (2012), relate their measure to bank asset
write-downs during the crisis. We discuss further the relation between our results and
those obtained by Anderson and Core (2015) and Chesney et al. (2012) in Section 6.. We
further contribute to existing work by using an encompassing definition of failure, which
accounts for the acquisition of firms in distress, as our main measure of risk.3 This ex post
measure of risk is meant to account for the tail risk that materialized during the crisis,
which standard measures of risk computed prior to the crisis may not capture. Finally, we
use a comprehensive set of control variables to account for other sources of incentives or
firm or CEO characteristics that may be related to both firm risk and CEO compensation,
including termination payments (as in Brown et al., 2015), inside debt (as in Bennett et al.,
2015), governance variables, complexity measures, and CEO characteristics, such as CEO
age or wealth.
2. Delta, Leverage, and CEO Risk-Taking Incentives
In a levered firm, any increase in firm value above the amount owed to debtholders is fully
appropriated by shareholders. At the same time, limited liability implies that shareholders’
losses are limited to their initial investment. Therefore, a long line of work in corporate
finance, starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Galai and Masulis (1976), argues
that leverage creates incentives for shareholders to take on risk, since greater risk redis-
tributes firm value from debtholders to shareholders. Moreover, the incentives to take on
risk increase as leverage increases. Figure 1 illustrates this point. For a firm with low lever-
age, such as firm A, the mean-preserving spread depicted in the figure does not change
the expected equity payoff. However, for a highly levered firm, such as firm B, the same
mean-preserving spread increases the payoff to equity holders if asset returns are high,
but does not reduce the payoff if returns are low, thereby increasing equity holders’ ex-
pected payoff. A greater sensitivity of a CEO’s wealth to his firm’s stock price (delta), by
increasing the extent to which the CEO benefits from increases in expected equity value,
would, thus, increase the risk-taking incentives of the CEO of the highly levered firm (B),
but not of the CEO of the firm with low leverage (A).4
3 Bennett et al. (2015) use actual default as one of their measures of bank risk.
4 Standard option pricing models can generate these predictions. The payoff for the share-
holders of a levered firm is similar to the payoff of a call option on the firm’s assets with
a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton,
1973). Thus, standard valuation models imply that the value of the equity of a levered firm
is increasing in the volatility of the firm’s asset value. These models also imply that the
sensitivity of the value of an in-the-money call option to the underlying asset’s volatility
increases as the value of the underlying asset gets closer to the strike price. For the case
of equity, this means that the sensitivity of equity value to asset volatility increases as
the value of the firm’s assets and the face value of debt get closer, or, in other words, as
leverage increases.
5Because of leverage, a higher delta increases a CEO’s incentives to increase risk so as
to transfer firm value from debtholders to equity holders. However, a greater delta may
also strengthen a CEO’s risk-taking incentives by increasing the extent to which the CEO
benefits from investing in risky projects that increase firm value. Thus, a CEO whose
compensation consists solely of fixed pay will not invest in risky projects that increase
the firm’s expected value if those projects increase the probability of failure, since the
CEO does not benefit from increases in firm value if the firm does not fail, and failure
implies giving up future fixed pay. If the CEO receives stock or stock options, he will
benefit from increases in firm value if the firm does not fail, so he may invest in risky
projects that increase the firm’s expected value, even if doing so increases the probability
of failure. The greater the CEO’s delta, the more he will benefit from the increases in equity
value generated by risky, value-increasing projects. Thus, a greater delta will increase his
incentives to undertake these risky projects. In the Online Appendix, we show that the
hypothesis that a higher delta increases CEO risk-taking incentives more in more levered
firms can, in fact, be derived formally from a model similar to the one proposed by John
and John (1993) to study the relation between leverage and compensation incentives.
The above arguments show that a high delta may increase CEOs’ risk-taking incentives
by increasing the extent to which they benefit from risky policies that increase equity
value. However, a higher delta may also reduce the risk-taking incentives of a risk-averse
CEO by increasing the cost of greater equity risk for the CEO. The restricted stock and
executive stock options that are part of executives’ compensation packages are typically
subject to vesting restrictions and are not tradeable. Moreover, CEOs are typically not
allowed to hedge their exposure to their firms’ stock price. Therefore, a CEO’s ability
to reduce his exposure to his firm’s equity value is limited. As a result, an increase in
equity risk will translate, other things equal (in particular, keeping expected equity value
constant), into a lower expected utility for a risk-averse CEO. Moreover, the impact of
the increase in equity risk on the CEO’s expected utility will be greater the greater the
exposure of the CEO’s wealth to the firm’s equity returns. Therefore, a higher delta may
create incentives to reduce risk (Guay, 1999). Because of this reason, several articles that
analyze the relation between CEO risk-taking incentives, as measured by vega, and firm
risk introduce delta as a control variable (Guay, 1999; Knopf et al., 2002; Coles et al.,
2006; Brockman et al., 2010).
The net sign and magnitude of the effect of an increase in delta on a CEO’s risk-taking
incentives will depend on the CEO’s risk tolerance and the return distribution of the
projects available to the firm. However, the risk-shifting incentives generated by leverage
imply that the effect of a higher delta on CEOs’ risk-taking incentives will more likely be
positive and of a greater magnitude in more levered firms. Therefore, we propose testing
the hypothesis that a higher delta reduces the probability of failure less, or increases the
probability of failure more, in more levered firms. To the best of our knowledge, this
hypothesis has not been previously tested in the literature on CEO risk-taking incentives,
although Chesney et al. (2012) and Anderson and Core (2015) test whether firm risk is
associated with measures of risk-taking incentives that take into account the impact of
leverage on the option value of equity.
As emphasized by the prior empirical literature on CEO risk-taking incentives, CEOs’
stock option holdings can generate additional risk-taking incentives. Executive stock op-
tions are call options on the firm’s stock and, thus, exhibit a convex relation between the
option’s payoff and the value of the underlying stock. This convexity implies that both
the expected payoff and the market value of a call option are increasing in the volatility
6of the underlying stock. Thus, Guay (1999) proposed to use the vega of a CEO’s portfolio
of stock options, which measures the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s option port-
folio to changes in the volatility of stock returns, as a measure of the CEO’s risk-taking
incentives. However, even if the market value of an executive stock option is increasing in
stock volatility, a higher stock volatility need not increase the expected utility of a risk-
averse CEO who cannot freely trade or hedge the option, because, as discussed above, the
higher volatility increases the risk of the executive’s option and stock portfolio (Lambert
et al., 1991; Guay, 1999; Ross, 2004; Ingersoll, 2006; Lewellen, 2006). Notwithstanding
this criticism, most recent papers analyzing CEOs’ risk-taking incentives measure these
incentives by means of vega (e.g., Knopf et al., 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Brockman et al.,
2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). In keeping with this literature, we also consider option
vega as a measure of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs.
3. Data
We select all firms covered by the compensation database ExecuComp with a 4-digit SIC
code between 6000 and 6300 and that are alive in year 2006. The SIC code reported by Ex-
ecuComp corresponds to the year in which information about the firm was last retrieved.
Therefore, we use the historical, time-varying, SIC code reported by the CRSP US Stock
Database to identify firms’ SIC codes as of year 2006. We include in the sample all firms
whose SIC code in 2006 is equal to 602 (Commercial Banks), 603 (Savings Institutions),
or 6712 (Offices of Bank Holding Companies)—a total of 114 firms—, and we exclude
from the sample firms with SIC code 6111 (Federal Credit Agencies). To determine the
inclusion in the sample of the firms in the remaining SIC codes, we search the National
Information Center of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
to verify each firm’s institution type in year 2006.5 We keep a firm in the sample if it is
identified as any type of regulated institution, which implies that the firm is a depository
institution or controls depository institutions (such as banks or savings and loan associ-
ations).6 Following Cheng et al. (2015), we also keep in the sample those firms listed as
primary dealers by the New York Fed. This step leads to the inclusion in the sample of
the large investment banks not selected in prior steps (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and
Merrill Lynch).7 This process yields a base sample of 134 firms in 2006, from which we
5 These firms have SIC codes: 6099 (Functions Related to Depository Banking, Not Else-
where Classified), 6141 (Personal Credit Institutions), 6159 (Miscellaneous Business Credit
Institutions), 6162 (Mortgage Bankers and Loan Correspondents), 6172 (Finance Lessors),
6199 (Finance Services), 6200 (Security and Commodity Brokers), 6211 (Security Brokers
and Dealers) and 6282 (Investment Advice). We access the National Information Center
of the FFIEC at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/SearchForm.aspx.
6 The classes of regulated institutions are: bank holding company, financial holding com-
pany, savings and loan holding company, federal savings bank, national bank, state member
bank, FDIC-insured non-member bank, federal savings association.
7 We obtain the historical list of primary dealers from https://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/pridealers_current.html#tabs-2 and match it with our sample manually by
name.
7drop five firms because there is not enough information to compute delta.8 Therefore, our
final sample has 129 firms. We report our final sample in Appendix 1..
We follow the exact same procedure for the years 2002 and 2010 to select the samples
that we use in Section 5.7 to replicate the analysis for the periods from 2003 to 2006 and
from 2011 to 2014, respectively.
Since we obtain compensation data from ExecuComp, our sample is composed of rela-
tively large, publicly traded financial institutions.9 The sample contains the largest listed
bank holding companies, which range from holding companies with national presence (such
as Citigroup, Bank of America, or Wells Fargo) to regional bank holding companies (such
as Fifth Third Bancorp., National City Corp., or Regions Financial Corp.), or compa-
nies operating mainly in one or two states (such as Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc. or
Tompkins Financial Corp.). The sample also contains mortgage lenders (such as Coun-
trywide Financial, IndyMac, or Washington Mutual), the five largest investment banks
(Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley),
and several companies (such as American Express Co. and Charles Schwab) that have
regulated depository subsidiaries.10
We obtain accounting information from Compustat Fundamentals and market data
from CRSP.
To compute delta and option vega, we follow standard practice in the literature (Guay,
1999; Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006) and define delta as the approximate change
in the value of the CEO’s stock and stock option portfolio associated with a 1% change in
stock price, and vega as the approximate change in the value of the CEO’s stock option


























where nS is the number of shares of stock held by the CEO, S is the stock price, ni is
the number of options of option grant i held by the CEO, Oi is the Black-Scholes value
of an option of grant i, modified to account for dividend payouts, and σS the volatility
of stock returns. We follow the procedure detailed by Coles et al. (2013) to compute the
different variables in expressions (1) and (2) from ExecuComp data.11 In those specifica-
tions in which incentives are measured before 2006, both delta and vega are calculated
using the one-year approximation technique described in Core and Guay (2002). This al-
8 We drop Center Financial Corp., with SIC 6036, because it does not match with Com-
pustat Fundamentals. We drop Bankunited Financial Corp., Commerce Bancshares Inc.,
First Financial Bancshares Inc., and Guaranty Financial Group Inc. because there is not
enough information to compute our measures of risk-taking incentives.
9 Our sample selection procedure excludes Federal Credit Agencies. Thus, for example,
Fannie Mae is not in our sample.
10 Although we often refer to the firms in our sample as banks, they are really holding
companies, most of which control bank subsidiaries.
11 We depart from the procedure by Coles et al. (2013) only in that we use as risk-free
interest rate the one provided by ExecuComp.
8ternative methodology for early years is necessary since the strike price and the maturity
of individual option grants are not available until year 2006.12
We measure leverage (following Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) as the ratio of the quasi-market
value of the firm (measured as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity) divided by the market value of equity. Table 1 provides
descriptive statistics of the incentive measures, leverage, and several firm characteristics
computed in year 2006. Both delta and vega display substantial dispersion and, especially
in the case of delta, are highly skewed.13 Although the distribution of leverage is less
disperse, there is also substantial variation in leverage among the firms in the sample,
with the 90th percentile being more than double the 10th percentile.
4. Research Design
4.1 Risk Taking and Failure
Our measure of risk taking in the years preceding the crisis is an encompassing measure of
bank failure during the crisis period. To date the crisis, we follow the timelines provided
by the New York Fed (which dates the beginning of the “financial turmoil” in June 2007,
when Bear Stearns pledged $3.2 billion to aid one of its hedge funds)14 and the Saint Louis
Fed (which dates the beginning of the financial crisis in February 2007, coinciding with
Freddie Mac’s announcement that it would no longer buy the riskiest subprime mortgages
and mortgage-related securities)15 and define 2007 to be the first year of the financial
crisis.
Because of the potentially systemic importance of many of the financial firms in our
sample, regulators may be expected to intervene to encourage sound firms to acquire fi-
nancially distressed ones so as to avoid actual default. Identifying failure with default
would, thus, not capture the instances of financial distress in which the regulators’ inter-
vention averts failure. Moreover, even in the midst of a financial crisis, outright default of
large financial institutions is too rare to allow for a precise estimation of the coefficients
of interest. Therefore, we define bank failure so as to encompass both institutions that
default and those that are acquired by other financial institutions with the support or
intervention of regulators.
More precisely, we first identify which firms in our sample are delisted in the period
2007-2010 by analyzing the series of monthly returns in the CRSP stock database. This
12 We note that for year 2006 we also compute the incentive measures differently for five
firms because of data availability. Starting December 15, 2006, SEC disclosure rules require
firms to report disaggregated information of option grants awarded to CEOs. However,
a few firms in our sample had an earlier fiscal year-end, so that they did not have to
comply with the new disclosure requirement until the next fiscal year (2007). For such
firms (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, and Washington
Federal Savings) we use the one-year approximation technique described in Core and Guay
(2002) to compute delta and vega.
13 The skewness of delta is further underscored by the fact that the maximum value of
delta (not reported in Table 1) is 45.16, very far from the 90th percentile (2.93).
14 http://www.ny.frb.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf.
15 http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline.
9process yields a set of 31 delisted firms. However, firms may delist for reasons other than
bankruptcy or financial distress. For example, firms may go private, merge, or be acquired
for strategic reasons even if they are sound. To determine whether firms were delisted
because of financial distress, we take the following steps:
1. We identify the main banking subsidiary of each firm in our sample from the firm’s
organizational hierarchy provided by the FFIEC’s National Information Center.
We classify a firm as failed if the FDIC indicates that the firm’s main banking
subsidiary was put into receivership or acquired with financial assistance from the
Fed or the FDIC during the crisis period.16 We identify 10 firms as failed in this
step.
2. Merger discount. Following the procedure used by Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we
use the SDC Platinum database to identify mergers and check whether delisted
firms not classified as failed in the previous step are acquired with a discount in
the crisis period. In particular, we identify three firms acquired with significant
discounts (with one-day, one-week and one-month negative premia of above 30%).
We also consider as failed a firm (Mellon) acquired with a one-day small discount
of 6%, as well as a firm (Countrywide) that is acquired with a one-day positive
premium of 40%, but with one-week and one-month discounts of 18% and 28%,
respectively.
3. For those delisted firms that we do not classify as failed in the previous steps, we
search the PROQUEST database using the company name and the following key-
words: failed, bankrupt, intervened, closed. The PROQUEST search identifies one
firm as failed (Lehman Brothers, which is identified from its Chapter 11 petition
filing).
4. We finally perform a web search using standard search engines. This broader inter-
net search indicates that one firm is acquired with substantial regulatory pressure
(Merrill Lynch), another one with TARP aid given to the acquiring institution
(National City Corp.), and another one after a large amount of TARP bailout
money is given to the target institution (Provident Bankshares).17
The procedure identifies 19 firms in the sample as failed. We provide the list of failed
firms, as well as the reason why they are identified as such, in Appendix 2..18
16 We obtain the information about the main banking subsidiaries from: http://www2.
fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp.
17 In the case of Merrill Lynch, there were sustained rumors that the Federal Reserve had
pressured Bank of America to carry out the acquisition, and Congressional hearings were
held in 2009 to determine, among other things, whether the Government or the Federal
Reserve had pressured or threatened Bank of America’s management to acquire Merrill
Lynch (see, e.g., Story and Becker, 2009). National City Corp. was acquired after being one
of the few qualified banks that was denied TARP help. On the contrary, the acquirer (PNC)
received TARP money a few weeks before the purchase of National City was announced,
a move that was widely interpreted as a push by supervisors to force National City to
agree to be acquired (see, e.g., Fitzpatrick et al., 2008). Finally, Provident Bankshares
Corp. received $151 million from TARP to prop up capital on Nov. 14, 2008. One month
later, M&T and Provident Bankshares Corp. announced that the former would acquire
the latter for $401 million.
18 Whereas media reports provide strong support for the identification as failed of most
firms classified as such in steps two to four, the cases of Mellon and Provident Bankshares
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4.2 Empirical Model
To analyze the relation between CEO risk taking incentives and firm risk we estimate a
model with a dummy variable equal to one if the firm fails during the crisis period as the
dependent variable and the incentive measures and control variables measured prior to
the crisis as independent variables.
We measure CEOs’ risk-taking incentives in year 2006. This choice of measurement
period is determined by several requirements. We require the measurement period to be
sufficiently close to the crisis to be able to potentially attribute to the compensation in-
centives an impact on the probability of failure during the crisis. We also require that the
incentive measurement period not be a crisis year for two reasons. First, to the extent that
bank failure was motivated by actions taken by banks in the years prior to the crisis, the
measurement of incentives would take place after the actions they were supposed to in-
centivize. Second, we would like to avoid capturing reverse causality: Measuring incentives
during the crisis could capture the reaction of CEOs’ compensation packages to negative
realizations of uncertainty during the crisis. Selecting 2006 as the measuring period allows
us to meet these two requirements and maximizes the availability and quality of the com-
pensation data, since a new set of compensation disclosure requirements became effective
in 2006: Starting in year 2006, firms were required to report pension benefits and ex-ante
termination payments, as well as disaggregated information about strike price and matu-
rity of option grants. Moreover, other studies use 2006 as their measurement period (e.g.,
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011), which makes it easier to compare our results with theirs.
Testing for the presence of interactions in nonlinear models (such as logit or probit)
is problematic (Greene, 2010), and our limited sample size makes estimation of nonlinear
models imprecise. Since we are mainly interested in the interaction between delta and
leverage, our preferred specification is, thus, the following linear probability model:
Failedi =β0 + β1ln(1 + V ega)i,2006 + β2ln(1 +Delta)i,2006+
+β3ln(1 +Delta)i,2006 × Leveragei,2006 + β4Leveragei,2006 + xi,2006γ + εi, (3)
where Failedi is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm fails in the period from
2007 to 2010 and xi,2006 is a vector of controls. We include the natural logarithm of the
compensation variables in (3) because of the positive skewness of the distribution of these
variables (especially of delta).19 We also winsorize all compensation variables at the 2nd
and 98th percentiles to reduce the influence of highly atypical observations. In Section 5.4,
we discuss the robustness of our results to the specification of the estimating equation.
We note that, by construction, our ex post measure of risk is cross-sectional. There-
fore, we cannot make use of fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved firm
heterogeneity.20
Corp. are less clear-cut. Our results are essentially unchanged if we do not consider these
institutions as failed. Not considering as failed the three firms identified as such in the last
step does not affect the results either.
19 We define the logarithmic transformation of each compensation variable y as ln(1 + y),
because some compensation variables are equal to zero for some firms.
20 In principle, one could specify a panel model with fixed effects by measuring failure with
quarterly or yearly frequency (instead of over the whole crisis period) and assuming that
failure in period t depends on incentives in periods t−K0 to t−K1, for someK1 ≥ K0 ≥ 1.
However, to estimate such a model, one could exploit only the longitudinal variation in
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4.3 Control Variables
We include control variables that are likely to be related to firm risk or CEO risk-taking
incentives. Moreover, several of these variables are correlated with delta and vega, so
omitting them could bias the estimation of the coefficients of interest. Since we aim to
capture the potential effect of risk-taking incentives on the likelihood of failure, we avoid,
as much as possible, using as controls variables that could be the result of those incentives.
To clarify this point, suppose that the credit risk of a bank’s loan portfolio were the only
variable determining bank risk. In this case, even if compensation strongly influenced
CEOs’ incentives to take on risk, we would observe no effect of compensation on bank risk
if we controlled for the credit risk of the loan portfolio in our regressions. We emphasize
that the goal of our analysis is not to accurately predict bank failure, but to estimate the
relation between pre-crisis incentives and bank failure during the crisis.
Leverage. If leverage were largely outside the control of the CEO and had a significant
effect on the probability of failure, then the estimated coefficient of the interaction between
delta and leverage could capture the potential effect of bank leverage on the probability of
failure, instead of the effect of CEO risk-taking incentives. Therefore, we include leverage
as a control in all our regressions. The cost of including leverage as a control is that, to the
extent that bank CEOs have the ability to influence leverage, and that leverage affects the
probability of failure, controlling for leverage may bias the estimate of the relation between
CEO risk-taking incentives and failure. For example, if CEOs with stronger risk-taking
incentives were more likely to select high levels of leverage (as suggested by Gormley
et al., 2013), and if higher leverage increased the probability of failure, then controlling
for leverage would lead to an underestimation of the effect of risk-taking incentives on
failure.
Bank size and complexity. Size may affect bank risk in different ways. Larger banks
may be less risky to the extent that they benefit from greater diversification, economies of
scale in risk management, or government support in case of distress. However, larger banks
may be riskier if they are more complex and the greater complexity translates into greater
risk, or if the belief that large banks are too big to fail allows these banks to increase their
risk. At the same time, size is significantly correlated with all the CEO compensation
variables. Therefore, we use the natural logarithm of total assets to control for firm size
in all our regressions.
To account for the potential impact of bank complexity on bank risk, we also use four
measures of complexity. First, we use the number of employees as an alternative measure
of size that may incorporate the greater complexity of managing a large organization. Sec-
ond, we use a measure of complexity reported by the Federal Reserve for U.S. domiciled
bank holding companies. To categorize a bank holding company as complex the Federal
Reserve considers, among other factors, the nature, riskiness, and scale of the company’s
non-banking activities, management factors, and the amount of public debt issued by the
company.21 Third, for the subsample of bank holding companies, we consider those that
failure and incentives for the 19 firms that fail during the sample period. Moreover, the
year-to-year variation in delta and vega is likely to be a rather noisy measure of the true
underlying changes in CEO risk-taking incentives.
21 The Federal Reserve’s complex indicator is the variable rssd9057, reported in the Bank
Regulatory - Bank Holding Companies database provided by Wharton Research Data Ser-
vices (WRDS). This database contains information about bank holding companies made
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are designated as financial holding companies to be more complex, since financial holding
companies typically engage in a much broader range of non-banking activities than other
bank holding companies.22 Fourth, we consider as complex bank holding companies those
that control at least two commercial banks.23 We note that the last three measures of
complexity are only available for bank holding companies (which constitute 73% of the
sample). Finally, we also consider banks with international operations as more complex.
To identify whether a bank holding company has an international presence we use the
information contained in several items in the financial statements that bank holding com-
panies file with the Federal Reserve.24 For firms that are not bank holding companies, we
determine their international presence manually from their annual reports.25
Total pay. Total pay may be correlated with CEOs’ risk-taking incentives or firm risk
for several reasons. First, total pay could be related to implicit incentives stemming from
the threat of replacement. If CEOs are replaced only when firm performance is dismal,
the threat of termination may provide incentives to reduce risk, since CEOs will seek
to lower the probability of negative tail risk (see, e.g., Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003). On
the other hand, if continuation as CEO requires being at the top of the distribution of
performance, then the threat of replacement may provide incentives for taking on risk.
Regardless of the sign of the relation between termination incentives and risk taking, the
strength of termination incentives is likely to be stronger for CEOs with a higher total
pay. Total pay could also be related to the quality of corporate governance and, as we
discuss below, corporate governance may affect CEOs’ incentives to take on risk. Finally,
total pay could also be correlated with firm risk if the CEOs of inherently riskier firms
need to be compensated for the extra risk or if riskier firms require more skilled CEOs
and, thus, have to pay more to attract them.
Termination payments. Termination payments reduce the CEO’s downside risk and,
thus, increase his risk-taking incentives. Severance payments also increase the cost of
CEO replacement and, thus, weaken termination incentives, and, as discussed above, the
sign of the relation between termination incentives and risk-taking is a priori ambiguous.
Termination payments could also be set in place in riskier firms (Rau and Xu, 2013).
available by the Chicago Fed’s financial reporting group: https://www.chicagofed.org/
banking/financial-institution-reports/index. We obtain all the data items produced
by the Federal Reserve from the Bank Regulatory - Bank Holding Companies database.
22 Item rssd9016 in the Federal Reserve’s RSSD database identifies whether a bank holding
company has been designated as a Financial Holding Company.
23 The median bank holding company in our sample controls only one commercial bank.
Results do not change if we consider bank holding companies that control more than two,
or more than three commercial banks to be complex.
24 In particular, we consider a firm to have international presence if any of the follow-
ing items in the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (form
FR Y-9C) or the Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Large Bank Holding
Companies (form FR Y-9LP) is non zero: Combined Foreign Nonbank Subsidiary Assets
(bhcp2793), Number of Foreign Nonbank Subsidiaries (bhcp2831), Quarterly Average of
Interest-Bearing Deposits in Foreign Offices, Edge and Agreement Subsidiaries, and IBFS
(bhck3404), and Trading Assets in Foreign Offices (bhck3542). All these items are retrieved
from the Bank Regulatory - Bank Holding Companies database provided by WRDS. Fi-
nally, we also use the variable Number Of Foreign Offices from Compustat Bank.
25 We consider a firm to have international presence if it reports having offices, sub-
sidiaries, or significant business abroad.
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Thus, we include both golden parachutes (termination payments contingent on a change
in control) and severance pay not contingent on a change of control as controls.
Debt-like compensation. Defined benefit pension plans and deferred compensation
are similar to debt claims. These debt-like claims (inside debt) may provide incentives to
limit risk similar to those of debtholders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu,
2011; Anderson and Core, 2015). Indeed, Bennett et al. (2015) report a negative relation
between CEOs’ inside debt and bank risk. Therefore, we include inside debt, which we
define as the sum of the present value of the CEO’s accumulated pension benefits from all
pension plans and the total aggregate balance of the CEO’s deferred compensation plans
(Cassell et al., 2012), as a control in our regressions.
Corporate governance and CEO autonomy. If the CEOs of poorly governed firms
are paid more and higher pay is not accompanied by changes in compensation structure,
the CEOs of poorly governed firms will have larger equity holdings and, thus, other things
equal, higher delta and vega. Moreover, poorly governed firms may make greater use of
equity compensation, especially stock options, because these forms of compensation can be
justified as providing incentives to the manager and because the cost to the firm of these
compensation vehicles may be easier to conceal or undervalue (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).
Therefore, delta and vega may be correlated with the quality of corporate governance.26
At the same time, governance quality may affect CEOs’ risk-taking incentives. Thus, if
entrenched CEOs are less likely to be replaced if the bank performs poorly, they may
be more willing to increase risk. Alternatively, poor governance may decrease firm risk
if less entrenched managers need to achieve stellar performance to keep their job (which
would increase their risk-taking incentives), whereas average performance is enough for
entrenched managers to avoid replacement. To the extent that entrenched managers earn
greater rents, they may also be less inclined to follow policies that increase the proba-
bility of failure.27 To account for the potential association between governance and risk
taking, we include several measures of governance quality as controls: board independence
(measured as the percentage of directors who are independent); board size (since larger
boards have often been described as less effective); Gompers et al. (2003)’s governance
index (GIM index) and the Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk et al. (2009) (higher values
of these indices denote greater managerial entrenchment); the ownership share of insti-
tutional blockholders (owning at least 5% of the firm’s shares); a dummy variable (CEO
duality) that indicates whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board; and the per-
centage of independent directors who joined the board after the current CEO was hired.
We obtain the information about board independence, board size, CEO duality, and the
percentage of independent directors hired after the CEO from RiskMetrics, BoardEx, and
proxy statements. We calculate both the E-index and the GIM index using the Governance
tables from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS, formerly known as RiskMetrics)
following Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). The data on institutional share-
holders comes from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database, as retrieved
from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
26 We note that one could also make the argument that CEO pay-performance sensitivity
will be lower in poorly governed firms. For our purposes, either argument suggests the
need to include measures of governance quality as controls.
27 Along these lines, Low (2009) shows that an increase in takeover protection leads to a
reduction in firm risk in non-financial firms, and Morellec et al. (2012) report calibration
results that indicate that more entrenched CEOs would choose lower leverage.
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Some of these governance variables can also be understood as measuring the degree of
autonomy of the CEO. For example, the CEO’s decision power may be less constrained
in firms in which the CEO is also the chairman of the board, in firms in which most
independent directors were appointed while the current CEO was in office, or in firms in
which institutional shareholders have small ownership stakes and can, thus, commit not
to curtail the CEO’s initiative (Burkart et al., 1997). At the same time, CEO autonomy
may be related to risk and pay-performance sensitivity. Thus, as argued by Prendergast
(2002), a principal may direct the agent and monitor the agent’s decisions in a stable
environment, in which the principal knows what the agent should do. However, in more
uncertain environments, the principal may grant greater discretion to the agent, so as
to benefit from the information obtained by the agent while on the job. Greater agent
discretion, in turn, requires a higher pay-performance sensitivity to elicit better decisions
or greater effort from the agent. Therefore, the CEOs of firms operating in a riskier
environment may both have greater autonomy and a greater delta.
CEO age and tenure. The implicit incentives stemming from the threat of replace-
ment are likely to be stronger for younger CEOs, since these CEOs may earn rents for a
longer time if they are not replaced. CEOs’ career concerns are also likely to be stronger
for younger CEOs and for CEOs with shorter tenure, because less information about their
abilities has accumulated and, in the case of age, because there are more years left in which
they may benefit from a higher perceived ability. At the same time, career concerns may
affect CEOs’ risk-taking incentives (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995; Breeden and Viswanathan,
1998). Therefore, we use as controls CEO age and tenure, both as CEO and as an em-
ployee of the firm, as well as the number of boards of listed firms at which the CEO has
served, as an additional measure of the amount of publicly available information about
the CEO’s abilities. CEO age may also account for potential differences between younger
and older CEOs in risk aversion or overconfidence. These personal characteristics may, in
turn, determine the form of the CEO’s compensation contract and, thus, be related to
delta and vega.
CEO wealth. If CEOs’ risk tolerance increases with their wealth, greater CEO wealth
may lead to greater risk. At the same time, the optimal levels of delta and vega are likely
related to CEOs’ risk tolerance. Therefore, we use as a control variable the measure of non-
firm wealth provided by Dittmann and Maug (2007). This measure is constructed using
historical data on CEO compensation and aims to capture the wealth not associated with
the CEO’s current holdings of his own firm’s equity.28
5. CEO Incentives and Bank Failure: Estimation Results
5.1 Main Results
In Table 2 we report the results of estimating model (3) with different sets of control
variables. To help evaluate the economic significance of the estimated coefficients for delta,
at the bottom of every column we report the changes in the average predicted probability
of failure associated with an increase in delta from its 25th to its 75th percentile for
28 We thank the authors for providing their data online at http://people.few.eur.nl/
dittmann/data.htm.
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two values of leverage (leverage at its 25th and 75th percentiles).29 The results in the
first column show that if leverage is not included in the regression, the coefficient of
delta is positive and large (although not significantly different from zero at conventional
significance levels), whereas the coefficient of vega is negative, small and not significantly
different from zero.30 Thus, even though we use a different risk measure and have a different
sample, our results without controls are broadly in line with the ones by Fahlenbrach and
Stulz (2011), who find a positive relation between delta and risk and no significant relation
between vega and bank risk. However, column 2 shows that if we include leverage and its
interaction with delta, the relation between the probability of failure and delta is negative
(or, at least, not significantly different from zero) for low values of leverage, whereas it is
positive and significant (statistically and economically) for high values of leverage. Thus,
an increase in delta from its 25th percentile to its 75th percentile is associated with an
increase in the probability of failure of 0.05 if leverage is at its 25th percentile and of 0.09
if leverage is at its 75th percentile. The latter increase is substantial in comparison to the
unconditional probability of failure, which is 0.15. These results suggest that a plausible
interpretation of the positive coefficient of delta in column 1 is that, in highly levered
firms, the risk-shifting incentives of delta outweigh the incentives it creates to moderate
risk. Since the large U.S. financial firms in the sample are highly levered, on average, a
higher delta increases risk-taking incentives among these firms.
In columns 3 to 8 of Table 2, we add different sets of control variables associated with
different potential explanations for the results in column 2: In column 3, we include vari-
ables that proxy for the strength of the incentives stemming from the threat of replacement
(total pay, CEO age and tenure, severance pay, and the number of boards of listed firms
at which the CEO has served); in column 4, we include total pay and inside debt to
control for the risk-taking incentives stemming from the debt-like components of CEO
compensation; in column 5, we include proxies for risk aversion (CEO age and wealth);
in column 6, we include controls for governance quality (the Entrenchment Index, board
independence, board size, the ownership share of institutional blockholders, the fraction
of independent directors elected after the appointment of the current CEO, and a dummy
variable indicating whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board);31 and in column
7, we include controls for complexity (number of employees, international presence, a com-
29 Letting P̂ (Delta, Leverage, V ega,x) denote the predicted probability of failure,
given values of Delta, Leverage, Vega, and the vector of control variables x, and
letting Deltap and Leveragep denote the p-th percentile in the sample distribution





P̂ (Delta75, LeverageL, V egai,xi)− 1N
∑N
i=1
P̂ (Delta25, LeverageL, V egai,xi),
for L = 25 and L = 75, where N denotes the size of the sample.
30 In all tables, we report robust standard errors. The standard errors of the coefficients
for delta and its interaction with leverage are similar if we use classical standard errors
instead. We do not report robust standard errors clustered by state or subsector, because
of the limitations of these standard errors when the number of clusters and the sample size
are small. However, clustered standard errors do not differ much from the ones reported
in Table 2 and, as we show in Section 5.2, results do not change qualitatively if we add
subsector dummies.
31 If we include the GIM Index instead of the Entrenchment index in column 6, its coeffi-
cient is not statistically significant either, and we obtain similar coefficients for delta and
its interaction with leverage.
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plexity dummy that captures whether the Federal Reserve considers the firm a complex
institution, and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm controls more than one
bank). Finally, in column 8, we include a set of controls that includes variables from the
different columns.32 The signs of the coefficients of delta and its interaction with leverage
are consistent across all specifications, and the latter coefficient is statistically significant
in all specifications. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients is, however, different in
two groups of specifications: the ones reported in columns 2, 5, 6 and 8, and those re-
ported in columns 3, 4, and 7. This difference may suggest that some control variables can
partly explain the relation between risk, delta and the interaction of delta with leverage.
However, the difference in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is not due to the
different sets of controls, but to the different composition of the subsamples with informa-
tion about the control variables included in each specification. As we explore further in
Section 5.2, the differences in coefficient estimates are due mainly to the presence in the
full sample of the major investment banks, which are not in the subsample of bank holding
companies in column 7 and several of which are not in the subsamples with information on
termination payments or inside debt (columns 3 and 4). In fact, if one estimates the model
in column 2 (with only firm size as a control) for each of the subsamples in columns 3 to
8, the coefficient estimates are essentially identical to the ones reported in those columns.
Alternatively, if one estimates the different specifications in Table 2 on the subsample of
firms included in all columns, the coefficient of the interaction between delta and leverage
is statistically significant in all specifications (even though this subsample is very small),
similar to the one reported in column 7, and barely changes across specifications. We
report these results in the Online Appendix.
The last two rows of Table 2 show that the coefficient estimates imply that a change in
delta from its 25th to its 75th percentile is associated with an increase in the probability
of failure of between 0.01 and 0.08 if leverage is at its 25th percentile, and a larger increase
between 0.05 and 0.23 if leverage is at its 75th percentile, with the difference in the effect
of the change of delta between the high- and low-leverage scenarios being in the range from
0.035 (column 5) to 0.177 (column 7). The magnitudes of these changes are large, as can be
seen by comparing them with the unconditional probability of failure, which ranges from
0.12 to 0.15 across subsamples. In contrast, the estimated coefficients for vega are small
in magnitude, not statistically significant, and change signs across specifications (even
if, in results reported in the Online Appendix, we restrict the sample to the subsample
included in all specifications). Only one control variable is statistically different from zero
in at least one specification (the variable that captures the share ownership of institutional
blockholders) and most estimated coefficients (with the exception of the coefficients of the
share ownership of institutional blockholders and of the CEO’s tenure in the company)
are small in magnitude, implying changes in the probability of failure associated with a
change in the variable from its 25th to its 75th percentile of less than three percent (in
absolute value).33
32 Because of the very large number of potential controls and the limited sample size, we
do not estimate a specification including all controls. Following Belloni et al. (2014), we
select controls that are either correlated with the dependent variable or the explanatory
variables of interest, so as to minimize the potential omitted variable bias, and that have
few missing values. To check the robustness of our results to different sets of controls, in
the Online Appendix, we report several alternative choices of the set of controls.
33 An exception is the estimation in column 7, whose sample contains only bank holding
companies. For this specification, the coefficient estimates for firm size, the dummy for
17
We emphasize that our results do not support the hypotheses that shareholder-manager
conflict and weak governance explain the relation between compensation incentives and
risk or are, otherwise, responsible for the different levels of risk taking among the firms
in our sample. First, the coefficients of delta and its interaction with leverage are barely
affected by the inclusion of governance variables. Second, we find no significant relation
between governance variables and risk, with the exception of the share ownership of in-
stitutional blockholders in the last specification. Moreover, we find that a higher share
ownership by institutional blockholders, which is usually interpreted as implying a better
monitoring of the CEO by shareholders, actually increases risk, although the coefficient is
statistically significant only at the 10% significance level.
We note that Bennett et al. (2015) find a negative relation between inside debt and bank
risk. Our results may differ from theirs in that they include a set of controls to account
for bank risk, such as non-performing loans, loan loss reserves, or brokered deposits, so
they estimate the residual effect of compensation incentives after controlling for these
variables.34 Brown et al. (2015) find a positive relation between termination payments
and bank risk, but they measure risk prior to the crisis.35
5.2 Investment Banks and Other Non-Bank Firms
Our sample includes the five major pre-crisis investment banks (Bear Stearns, Goldman
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) and four other firms whose
main business is brokerage and investment banking (even if they own depositary sub-
sidiaries). These investment banking firms exhibit very large values of delta (of the five
largest values of delta in the sample, four, including the maximum, correspond to invest-
ment banks) and leverage, as well as a high failure rate (three out of the nine investment
banking firms fail). Therefore, the presence of investment banks in the sample may ex-
ert a large influence over the estimated coefficients. In addition to investment banks, the
sample also contains firms specialized in investment advice (such as Franklin Resources or
T. Rowe Price) and retail brokerage (such as Charles Schwab). Apart from having a very
different business model and capital structure, some of these firms have very large values
of delta (notably Charles Schwab, in which the founder and CEO in year 2006 holds a
very large ownership stake), which, again, could have a large influence on the estimated
coefficients. Irrespectively of these econometric concerns, it is important to understand
whether our results are due solely to differences between these subgroups of financial
firms and the rest of the financial firms in the sample, whose main activity has to do with
lending, or whether the relation between delta and failure also holds within the latter group
of financial firms. In particular, risk-taking incentives may be different for bank holding
international presence, and the dummy for the control of more than one bank imply
changes in the probability of failure of between 0.07 and 0.15 when the corresponding
variable changes from its 25th to its 75th percentile. For comparison, for this specification,
the change in the probability of failure when delta changes from its 25th to its 75th
percentile is 0.23 when leverage is at its 75th percentile.
34 Their sample is different form ours, since it is composed solely of bank holding compa-
nies. However, if we estimate the specification in column 4 of Table 2 for the subsample of
bank holding companies, the coefficient of inside debt is still not statistically significant.
35 However, Muscarella and Zhao (2015) find a negative relation between termination
payments and firm risk in S&P 500 firms.
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companies, whose funding stems mostly from guaranteed deposits and which, because of
their key role within the payment system, may be more likely to be bailed out than other
financial institutions. Therefore, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 we report the results of
estimating model (3) with dummies for the different subsectors of financial firms in the
sample: commercial banks (SIC code 602); savings institutions (SIC code 603); personal
credit institutions (SIC code 6141); mortgage bankers and loan correspondents (SIC code
6162); security brokers, dealers, and flotation companies (SIC code 6211); and investment
advice (SIC code 6282).36 Including these subsector dummies affects the magnitude of the
coefficients for delta, leverage, and vega (as compared to the ones reported in columns
2 and 8 of Table 2), but they are all not significantly different from zero. However, the
coefficients for the interaction between delta and leverage and their statistical significance
are unaffected by the inclusion of subsector dummies. In columns 3 to 6 of Table 3 we
further explore the influence of subsector heterogeneity by excluding investment banks
and investment advice firms (in columns 3 and 4) and by, in addition to excluding those
firms, focusing only on bank holding companies (in columns 4 and 5).37 Excluding in-
vestment banks and investment advice firms, or considering only bank holding companies,
leads to a large and negative coefficient of delta and a large and positive coefficient of
its interaction with leverage, coefficients that are very similar regardless of whether we
include no controls or the full set of controls.38 These results help explain the difference
between the coefficients in columns 3, 4, and 7 in Table 2 and in the other columns of that
table, since the subsamples that we use to estimate our model with termination payments
or inside debt as controls do not include a large fraction of investment banks because of
data availability, and the subsample in column 7 does not contain any investment bank.39
36 In the sample, there are firms in 8 different 4-digit SIC codes as of December 2016, but
one SIC code (6199) contains only one firm (Citigroup), which has a 6020 SIC code in
other years, so we merge this firm with the subsector of commercial banks (which contains
the other large bank holding companies). We also merge the SIC codes 6035 and 6036,
which differ only in whether they are federally charted.
37 We note that the distinction between bank holding companies and other firms is not
done on the basis of their SIC code. A firm is a bank holding company, and, as such, is
supervised by the Federal Reserve, if it controls one or more commercial banks. Although
most bank holding companies in our sample have SIC code 602 (corresponding to commer-
cial banks), a few have other SIC codes. None of the investment banks is a bank holding
company as of year 2006, but two bank holding companies (which are excluded from the
sample in columns 4 and 5) have SIC code 6282 (Investment Advice).
38 To understand why these coefficients are larger in magnitude than the corresponding
coefficients reported in Table 2, it is important to notice that our dependent variable is
a dummy variable, so it is bounded between 0 and 1. Therefore, if there are failed firms
(that is, firms with the maximum value of the dependent variable) with very high values
of the interaction between delta and leverage (such as the failed investment banks), the
estimated coefficient of the interaction term will tend to be low, to minimize the extent to
which predicted values of the dependent variable exceed 1 for high values of the interaction
term or fall below 0 for low values of the interaction term.
39 As we note in Section 3., delta and vega are computed differently for four investment
banks, because we have less precise information about the option holdings of these banks’
CEOs. Therefore, excluding investment banks greatly reduces the potential impact on
our results of having firms whose delta and vega is computed differently. In fact, if one
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Therefore, the estimated relation between delta, leverage, and bank failure holds even
more strongly as we narrow down the sample to more bank-like financial firms.
5.3 Too-Big-To-Fail Institutions
We identify as failed those firms that either close or are acquired with the intervention of
bank supervisors. However, there may be distressed financial institutions that supervisors
would not allow to fail, but that are too large to find a suitable acquirer. These financial
institutions may, thus, not be part of our list of failed institutions, even if they took on
large risks ex ante and experienced strongly negative outcomes as a result of those risks.
This possibility may bias our estimates towards zero if the risk-taking incentives of the
firms that are both too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-be-acquired are strong and if these firms
took on large risks. On the other hand, it may lead us to overestimate the relation between
risk-taking incentives and bank risk if large banks take on large risks yet, for some reason,
opt for compensation arrangements with low values of delta.
We take two approaches to evaluate the potential biases generated by too-big-to-fail
institutions. First, following Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we consider Citigroup and Bank
of America as failed, given the massive amount of aid they received from the government.
The estimation results (reported in the Online Appendix) are identical to those in Table
2. Second, we identify the banks in the sample that could be considered both too-big-
to-fail and too-big-to-be-acquired, which we label TBTF banks. We use two definitions
of TBTF. First, we use the total assets as of December 2006 of the smallest institution
(Keycorp) included in the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (the stress test)
as the threshold to determine whether a firm is TBTF, since the inclusion of a firm in the
2009 stress test can be taken as a signal that regulators deemed the firm to be of systemic
importance. With this definition, we identify 25 firms as TBTF. The problem with this
definition is that seven out of the “TBTF” firms actually fail during the crisis (according
to our definition of failure). Therefore, we use as well an alternative definition of “revealed”
TBTF: We identify as revealed-TBTF those firms with total assets as of December 2006
that are larger than those of the largest failed institution in our sample (Merrill Lynch).
This criterion results in a set of four revealed-TBTF firms: Citigroup, Bank of America,
JPMorgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs.40 A comparison of columns 1 to 4 in Table 4 and
columns 2 and 8 in Table 2 (which contain the results of the baseline specifications) shows
that including a dummy variable to identify TBTF firms does not significantly affect
the estimated coefficients of delta and its interaction with leverage. In the subsample of
excludes from the sample these four investment banks, as well as those firms for which
we use information from year 2005 to compute delta and vega, and then re-estimates the
specifications reported in columns 2 and 8 in Table 2, the results are very similar to those
reported in columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 (which are obtained excluding investment banks
and investment advice firms from the sample).
40 If size is measured by market capitalization as of December 2006, the largest failed
institution is Wachovia, and the TBTF institutions are Citigroup, Bank of America, JP-
Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo. Using the definition of revealed-TBTF based on market
capitalization leads to results identical to the ones we report for the asset-based definition.
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bank holding companies, the inclusion of the too-big-to-fail dummies slightly increases the
magnitude of the coefficients of delta and its interaction with leverage.41
5.4 Specification
The high positive skewness of delta and of its interaction with leverage and, to a lesser
extent, of other compensation variables, motivates including their logarithmic transforma-
tions in the estimating equation. To check the sensitivity of the results to this transfor-
mation, we report in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 the results of estimating model (3) with
the untransformed compensation variables. In columns 3 through 6, we also report the
results of estimating probit and logit models instead of a linear probability model. Since
testing for the presence of interaction effects in non-linear models is problematic (Greene,
2010), we focus on checking whether the estimated changes in the probability of failure
associated with changes in delta for different values of leverage are consistent across spec-
ifications. In all cases, a change in delta from the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated
with a negative or positive and small change in the probability of failure if leverage is
at its 25th percentile, whereas the change is larger (between 1 and 5 percentage points
higher, depending on the specification) and positive if leverage is at its 75th percentile.
The differences between the estimated changes in the probability of failure for low and
high levels of leverage are very similar to the ones reported at the bottom of columns 2
and 8 in Table 2, except for the linear model with untransformed variables, in which the
difference is smaller.42
We note that the coefficient of delta is negative in all the specifications reported in
columns 2 to 8 in Table 2 and in all the specifications reported in tables 3, 4, and 5, and
the coefficient of the interaction between delta and leverage is positive and statistically
significant (at least at the 10% level) in all specifications. Therefore, our main results are
largely robust to the choice of control variables, sample (since different specifications are
estimated with different subsamples, because of data availability), and functional form.
5.5 Risk vs. Poor Management
A possible concern about the use of failure as a measure of risk is that it may capture poor
management rather than risk. If failure reflects poor management, the results in previous
sections may capture the correlation between persistent firm or managerial quality, delta,
and leverage. To address these concerns, we include measures of pre-crisis profitability as
controls. If failure during the crisis is due to persistent poor management, the estimated
41 If, instead of including a dummy variable, we exclude from the sample the TBTF
firms (according to either definition), estimated coefficients barely change with respect to
those reported in Table 2. The standard errors of the coefficients are higher, however, if
we exclude the firms identified as TBTF using the stress test definition, which is to be
expected given that excluding these firms significantly reduces the sample’s size and takes
away 7 out of the 19 firms that fail during the sample period.
42 We also estimate the baseline model (in logs) without winsorizing the compensation
variables or winsorizing them at different percentiles. We also include the natural logarithm
of leverage instead of leverage to account for a possibly diminishing effect of leverage on
failure. In all cases, the results (reported in the Online Appendix) barely change relative
to the ones presented in Table 2.
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coefficient of the pre-crisis profitability measure will be negative. Moreover, if the corre-
lation between persistent firm quality, leverage and delta is driving the results, including
pre-crisis profitability as a control may reduce the magnitude and statistical significance
of the coefficients for delta and its interaction with leverage. To measure pre-crisis prof-
itability we use the market-to-book ratio of equity as of December 2006, average ROA in
the period 2004-2006, and average stock returns in the same period, although we note that
all these variables could also be proxies of firm risk. The results in Table 6 show that the
coefficients of the market-to-book ratio and of stock returns in one of the specifications
are negative (although small and not statistically significant at conventional significance
levels), whereas the coefficients of both ROA and of stock returns in one of the specifica-
tions are positive (although only statistically significant, at the 10% level, in the case of
average ROA). At the same time, the coefficients of delta and its interaction with leverage
barely change with respect to those reported in Table 2. Taken together, these results do
not support the hypotheses that the relation between delta, leverage, and failure is due to
the correlation of these variables with persistent profitability. If anything, the coefficients
of ROA suggest that failed banks had higher profitability prior to the crisis.
5.6 Alternative Risk Measures
The results in previous sections show that a larger delta in highly levered firms is associated
with a higher probability of failure. In this section, we check whether a similar relation
between delta, leverage, and risk is obtained if we use other measures of firm risk computed
during the crisis period. First, we use the measure of the distance to default proposed
by Bharath and Shumway (2008), and the corresponding expected default frequency, as
alternative, continuous measures of the probability of failure. Second, for comparison with
previous work, we also use the volatility of stock returns, the market beta of the firm’s
stock (as in Cheng et al., 2015, or DeYoung et al., 2013) and the buy-and-hold returns of
the firm’s stock (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011).
Merton’s (1974) distance-to-default (DD) measures the distance of the expected log
asset value to the log value of the firm’s liabilities, scaled by the volatility of the log asset
value. Bharath and Shumway (2008) propose a “na¨ıve” DD measure with the same func-
tional form as the one obtained from Merton’s (1974) model, but in which some variables
(namely, the value and volatility of the firm’s assets) are approximated instead of being
obtained as solutions of the model. In addition to its simplicity, Bharath and Shumway
(2008) show that this measure outperforms the model-implied Merton’s DD in forecasting
firm failure. Under the assumptions of the Merton’s model, one can compute the expected
default frequency (EDF) as Φ(−DD), where Φ is the standard normal distribution func-
tion.43
We compute DD and EDF yearly and then aggregate the yearly measures into a single
measure for the 2007-2010 period. Because of attrition during the crisis, a simple average
of the yearly measures may overestimate (underestimate) DD (EDF) for the firms that fail
early during the crisis period, since the average DD (EDF) for these firms is computed over
a relatively benign period, whereas the average for the surviving firms is computed also
over the latter part of the crisis period, in which the values of DD (EDF) are generally lower
(higher). Therefore, we compute the average values over the 2007-2010 period, but in the
43 In the Online Appendix, we describe in detail the formula and data used to compute
Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) DD and EDF.
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calculation of these averages, we impute a DD (EDF) equal to 0 (1) to failed firms in the
years after their failure.44 In Table 7, we report the results of estimating equation (3) with
DD or EDF as the dependent variable instead of Failed. In the case of EDF, we estimate
a Tobit model in which we replace the dependent variable by one for failed firms, because
the EDF measure is bounded above by one and its value for failed firms is negligibly
different from one. We note that a positive coefficient implies that risk is decreasing in
the corresponding variable if DD is the dependent variable, whereas it implies that risk
is increasing in the corresponding variable if EDF is the dependent variable. Consistently
with the results we obtain with Failed as the dependent variable, the coefficient of delta
is positive (negative) and the coefficient of the interaction term is negative (positive) in
the specifications with DD (EDF) as the dependent variable, although increases in delta
decrease DD, or increase EDF, only for values of leverage above the 75th percentile (but
still in the range of values of leverage in the sample). We note that, in contrast to the results
with Failed as the dependent variable, the coefficient of vega is statistically significant in
some specifications, in which a higher vega is associated with lower risk, as measured by
a higher DD.
Following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we also measure risk using the volatility of
stock returns, beta, and buy-and-hold returns computed over the period from July 1,
2007, to December 31, 2008. This period essentially coincides with a period of continuously
falling stock prices in the financial sector, which extends from June 2007 to March 2009,
so greater priced risk should result in lower returns during the period. Extending the
measurement period into 2009 would be unlikely to capture news about risk taking prior
to the crisis and would capture, instead, the effects of actions taken by banks during the
crisis (whereas our measure of incentives captures CEO incentives prior to the crisis). As
argued by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), returns in later parts of the crisis may also reflect
to a large extent news about regulators’ actions, rather than news about CEOs’ decisions
about risk taken prior to the crisis.
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 8 show that, for the three risk measures, a higher delta
translates into higher risk (note that lower buy-and-hold returns imply higher ex ante
risk taking) for high levels of leverage but not so (or to a lesser extent) for low levels of
leverage. However, the magnitude of the difference between the effect on risk of a higher
delta if leverage is high and the effect if leverage is low is smaller than if risk is measured by
the estimated probability of failure.45 Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term is
statistically significant (at the 10% level) only for beta. Therefore, the results are broadly
consistent with, but weaker than, the ones we obtain if we use failure or DD to measure
risk.
A possible explanation for the weaker results obtained when we use buy-and-hold re-
turns to measure risk is that, because of limited liability, returns are bounded below at −1.
If we let y∗ denote the expected discounted sum of expected cash flows net of debt claims,
higher risk taking prior to the crisis is likely to lead to negative, and possibly large, values
of y∗ during the crisis. However, because of limited liability, the stock price y is equal to
44 We note, however, the results barely change if we simply use the average or the mini-
mum (maximum) value of DD (EDF) as measures of default risk during the crisis period.
45 One can evaluate this magnitude by comparing the predicted changes in the dependent
variable reported at the bottom of Table 8 with the average of the dependent variable.
Comparing those changes with the sample standard deviation of the dependent variable
(not reported) leads to a similar conclusion.
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max{y∗, 0}. Thus, the stock price (and, as a result, stock returns as well) is a left-censored
variable, which leads to biased coefficients if model (3) is estimated using OLS. In normal
periods, the left-censoring of returns may not be a concern, but returns during the crisis
are effectively −1 for a significant fraction of stocks in our sample (for example, six stocks
have returns lower than −0.99 and fourteen stocks have returns below −0.9), so the bias
may be significant.46 To deal with this potential bias, we replace the returns of failed firms
by −1 and estimate a Tobit version of model (3).47 The Tobit estimates, which we report
in column 4 of Table 8 are more in line with the ones we obtain when we measure risk
using failure or DD.
Another reason why the results for buy-and-hold returns and DD may differ is that
stock returns incorporate the expectation of bailouts or, in general, government support
of the financial sector. Because of banks’ role in the payment system and because of
the costs of resolving insured depository institutions, bailout expectations may affect the
returns of banks more than those of other financial institutions, such as mortgage lenders
not financed mainly through deposits, brokerage firms, or asset managers. Therefore, we
also reestimate the specification with buy-and-hold returns as the dependent variable for
the subsample of bank holding companies. As in the cases in which we use Failed or DD
as dependent variables, the results, which we report in column 5 of Table 8, are stronger
and highly statistically significant if we restrict the sample to bank holding companies.48
5.7 Incentives and Risk Before and After the Financial Crisis
One would like to know whether the relation between delta, leverage, and risk that we
document in the previous sections is a phenomenon specific to the particular period imme-
diately preceding the crisis. However, it is not possible to implement our empirical strategy
in other periods. The financial crisis is a unique laboratory to analyze the relation between
incentives and firm risk, because it is a realization of a negative tail shock affecting the
whole financial industry. Therefore, failure during the crisis can capture firms’ exposure to
aggregate tail risks, which is very difficult to measure in good times. From a purely econo-
metric point of view, the financial crisis is also the only period since year 1993 (when
regulatory reforms made it possible to compute delta and vega for the CEOs of listed
firms) in which there is a substantial incidence of firm failure among the relatively large
listed financial firms for which we have compensation information. In other periods, there
are too few failures among these firms to use realized failure as a measure of risk taking.
To shed light on the relation between compensation incentives, leverage and the risk of
bank failure in other periods, we replace the failure dummy variable with the alternative
46 Moreover, our measure of buy-and-hold-returns is likely to overestimate the returns of
failed firms because to compute buy-and-hold returns for failed firms we effectively assume
that the final proceeds to equity holders, computed using reported delisting returns, are
invested until December 31, 2008, in a risk-free deposit with a zero return. Therefore, the
returns of failed stocks post failure are significantly larger than those of even relatively
healthy financial institutions, which experience negative returns throughout the period.
47 We note that 12 out of 19 failed firms have returns below −0.9 and only 2 have returns
above −0.7. We also note that we obtain essentially the same results if we also replace the
returns of surviving firms with buy-and-hold returns lower than −0.9 by −1.
48 We note that results are similar or stronger if we estimate a Tobit model, if we include
the too-big-too-fail dummies, or if we exclude too-big-to-fail banks from the sample.
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measures of default risk (DD and EDF) introduced in Section 5.6 and re-estimate the main
regressions for the four-year periods from 2003 to 2006 and from 2011 to 2014. The results,
which we report in Table 9, are significantly weaker, but mostly in line with the ones we
obtain with these measures during the financial crisis. Thus, the coefficients of delta and of
its interaction with leverage have the same signs as the ones in Table 7, with the exception
of the coefficients in column 3, which are essentially zero. However, the coefficients of the
interaction term tend to be smaller in magnitude and they are not statistically significant
in some specifications.49 A possible interpretation of these results is that the relation
between delta, leverage and risk is not particular to the period immediately preceding the
crisis, but is weaker in other periods. However, an alternative interpretation of the weaker
relation between incentives and the risk measures is that these measures fail to capture in
normal times firms’ exposure to aggregate tail risks, such as a significant drop in housing
prices.
6. Discussion of the Results
Endogeneity of Compensation and Interpretation of the Results. Our results are
consistent with the theoretical argument that the effect of delta on CEOs’ incentives to
take on risk depends on bank leverage: Whereas a higher delta provides weak incentives, or
a disincentive, to take on risk in firms with low leverage, a higher delta provides incentives
for risk taking in highly levered firms. However, delta may be endogenous, since it may
be correlated with unobserved determinants of CEO risk-taking incentives or firm risk.
Therefore, we also consider alternative, non-causal interpretation of our results.
First, delta may be related to other governance or compensation features that influence
CEOs’ risk-taking incentives or constrain CEOs’ ability to manage risk. To account for the
influence of these factors, we include control variables that proxy for governance features
(GIM index, E-index, board size, board independence, CEO duality, the percentage of
independent directors elected after the CEO was appointed, institutional ownership) and
the strength of other potential incentives (inside debt, total pay, CEO age, termination
payments). Including these control variables does not alter the sign or magnitude of the
estimated coefficients of delta and its interaction with leverage, which suggests that these
coefficients are not capturing the relation between delta and risk-taking incentives other
than those created by equity compensation.50 However, our control variables are noisy
proxies of the incentives and constraints faced by CEOs when determining firm risk, so
our coefficient estimates could still be capturing the fact that some unobserved risk-taking
incentives are stronger in firms with both high leverage and high delta.
Second, the assignment of compensation contracts to CEOs may not be orthogonal to
banks’ inherent or target riskiness. Thus, our results could be due to the fact that firm risk
determines CEO compensation, instead of reflecting a causal effect of compensation on risk
via the CEO’s risk-taking incentives. In standard principal-agent models, the performance
49 We report specifications with average DD and EDF as dependent variables, because
attrition is not a significant problem during these periods. Results do not change qualita-
tively if we replace average DD and EDF by the minimum DD and the maximum EDF
during the period, respectively.
50 Recall that the differences across specifications in the estimated coefficients of interest
are largely due to whether investment banks are included in the sample.
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sensitivity of pay should be, other things equal, negatively correlated with firm risk, since
the cost of linking pay to performance (in terms of a higher risk premium that has to
be paid to the CEO) is higher for firms with more volatile performance.51 However, as
argued by Prendergast (2002), greater risk may be correlated with the need to grant
greater discretion to the CEO or with a higher value of his effort, which may call for
a higher pay-performance sensitivity to elicit better decisions or greater effort from the
CEO. In line with these arguments, Cheng et al. (2015) propose that banks that are
inherently riskier (which would make a low sensitivity of pay to performance optimal) are
also banks in which the marginal return of CEO effort is higher (which would make a high
pay-performance sensitivity optimal). If the relation between riskiness and the marginal
productivity of CEO effort were positive and strong enough, the CEOs of riskier firms
would not have significantly lower deltas and could even have higher deltas. Therefore, an
explanation of our results along the lines of the one provided by Cheng et al. (2015) would
be that the marginal return of CEO effort or the degree of CEO discretion is strongly
correlated with firms’ inherent riskiness in highly levered firms, but less so in less levered
firms. Further work is needed to assess the plausibility of these hypotheses, although we
note that controlling for CEO discretion does not affect our results.
An alternative, non-causal, explanation of our results is that riskier firms seek more
risk-tolerant CEOs, either because it is less costly for risky firms to hire risk-tolerant
CEOs (which require a lower compensation for their exposure to firm risk) or because
more risk-tolerant CEOs are more likely to implement the desired risky policies. As a
result, riskier firms may offer contracts with greater pay-performance sensitivity, since
these contracts may be more attractive for CEOs with greater risk tolerance (Ackerberg
and Botticini, 2002). Although we include CEO age and CEO wealth to control for risk
tolerance, these variables may capture only part of the differences in risk tolerance across
CEOs, so our results could be explained by the matching of risk-tolerant CEOs with firms
with high leverage and delta. However, an explanation along these lines would require
that riskier firms—conditionally on leverage—seek risk-tolerant CEOs if they are highly
levered, but not if they have low leverage, or that the value of a high-delta contract for
a risk-tolerant CEO is high (relative to the value of the contract for a less risk-tolerant
CEO) if the firm is highly levered but not if it has low leverage.
Policy Implications. Our empirical analysis cannot directly address the question as
to whether compensation incentives led to socially inefficient levels of risk at U.S. financial
institutions and, thus, cannot determine whether regulating the pay of bank executives
is socially optimal. However, our results do contribute to the policy debate about the
regulation of pay in financial firms in several ways. First, we show, in contrast to some
previous results, that CEO compensation incentives at U.S. financial firms are related to
the risk of failure during the financial crisis. The broad policy implication of this evidence
is that there may be a rationale for regulating pay in order to control risk at financial
institutions. Second, we show that high risk is associated with a combination of high
exposure of the CEO’s wealth to his firm’s equity (delta) and high leverage. Stock options
grants contribute to risk taking incentives through their effect on delta but not vega.
According to our results, the sensitivity of option value to stock return volatility (vega) is
not related to firm risk. Therefore, our results have the more concrete policy implications
that: a) limiting option compensation may not be an effective tool to limit risk-taking
51 See Prendergast (2002) for a discussion of the standard models and the empirical
evidence relative to the relation between risk and incentives.
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incentives; b) regulators should focus on the CEO’s overall equity exposure (delta); and
c) the limits to delta should depend on the firm’s leverage. We note that these policy
implications apply if the effect of delta on risk that we uncover is causal. However, even
if the effect were not causal, limiting delta could still reduce firm risk either by making it
more costly for riskier firms to compensate their CEOs for their risk exposure (since risky
firms would not be able to offer the cost-minimizing contract to their CEOs) or by not
allowing financial firms to attract the more risk-tolerant managers.
We also note that the policy implications of our results apply to contexts in which the
delta of bank executives is high. Thus, it is an open question whether these implications
also hold in countries in which the delta of bank CEOs is low. For example, although
the evidence about executive compensation in Europe is much more limited, it appears
that the equity exposure of the CEOs of the large European banks prior to the crisis was
lower than that of their U.S. counterparts (Ayadi et al., 2012; Murphy, 2013; Vallascas
and Hagendorff, 2013; Uhde, 2016). Limiting delta could be an ineffective tool to reduce
risk in such a context.
An additional consideration in designing pay regulation is that limiting delta in highly
levered banks could have unintended consequences. First, the reduction in risk achieved
by limiting delta may come at the cost of providing CEOs with weaker incentives to find
or implement positive NPV projects. Second, the impact that such regulation may have
on banks’ leverage choices needs to be better understood. For example, to the extent that
CEOs cannot substitute fixed pay for equity pay, CEOs may have an incentive to reduce
leverage so as to circumvent or reduce limitations on equity pay. However, predicting
the effect that leverage-dependent constraints on compensation may have on leverage is
difficult, since the interaction of compensation and leverage decisions is complex and our
theoretical understanding of their joint determination is still limited.52
To limit delta, regulators could use explicit caps on delta conditional on leverage or pe-
nalize a higher delta more strongly for higher levels of leverage. For example, recent E.U.
regulations (as established by the Directive 2013/36/EU, known as the Capital Require-
ments Directive IV) that set a maximum ratio of variable to fixed pay penalize delta by
forcing financial institutions to increase the fixed component of pay if they want to increase
the CEO’s equity exposure. Making the maximum ratio of variable to fixed compensation
decrease with leverage would make the penalty from using delta increase with leverage.
To limit the unintended consequences of one-size-fits-all constraints, the constraints on
delta could be alternatively implemented through the supervisory process. Thus, super-
visors may be instructed to consider a high delta as unsafe if a bank is highly levered
and to demand a reduction in delta in such a case, but be allowed room to exercise their
discretion as to the need for and the magnitude of the reduction. The implementation
52 The few existing models of the joint determination of managerial compensation and
leverage make very different assumptions about who holds control rights over leverage
and compensation (the manager or shareholders), about the influence of the manager’s
choices on asset risk, and about the nature of the agency problem between shareholders
and managers, and, in most cases, impose very strong constraints on the form of the
manager’s compensation, such as assuming that the manager’s pay consists solely of equity
(Morellec, 2004; Cadenillas et al., 2004; Lewellen, 2006; Carlson and Lazrak, 2010; Morellec
et al., 2012). Moreover, the relation between leverage and compensation derived from these
models is often non-monotonic and obtained numerically. Thus, it is difficult to predict
how constraints on compensation may affect equilibrium compensation and leverage.
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of the constraints to delta through the supervisory process could, however, be limited by
supervisory resources or capture.
Vega. Whereas our results show that delta is associated with bank risk, they also show
that vega, which is the most common measure of risk-taking incentives employed in prior
work, is not associated with bank failure during the crisis. Although vega has important
limitations as a measure of risk-taking incentives, prior work has often found vega to be
related to firm risk. In particular, DeYoung et al. (2013) find a positive relation between
vega and firm risk (measured by means of beta, stock return volatility, or idiosyncratic
volatility), but they measure risk prior to the crisis, and Gande and Kalpathy (2015) find
vega to be associated with the extent of U.S. Federal Reserve emergency loans during the
crisis. The absence of an association between vega and bank failure in our sample could
be due to the facts that there is greater variation in delta than in vega in the sample,
that there is a positive correlation between both variables (and between either one and
leverage), and that the effect of delta on incentives is stronger than the one stemming
from vega. Under these circumstances, it may be difficult to capture the effect of vega in
a sample of moderate size.
Our combined results about the relation between bank risk, delta, and vega suggest
that the strong trend among financial firms, initiated in the early 2000s, of replacing stock
option compensation by restricted stock may not, by itself, significantly alter the risk-
taking incentives of bank CEOs. Our evidence also suggests that regulatory restrictions
on the use of stock options may have a limited impact on the risk-taking incentives of
bank CEOs.
Relation to Valuation Models of the Risk-Taking Incentives of Equity. As men-
tioned in the introduction, Chesney et al. (2012) and Anderson and Core (2015) provide
valuation models to compute the derivative of the market value of equity (modeled as
an option on firm value) with respect to changes in the volatility of firm value. Further,
Chesney et al. (2012) find a positive association between their measure of the sensitivity
of CEO wealth to asset value volatility and banks’ asset write-downs during the financial
crisis.53 The approach of Chesney et al. (2012) and Anderson and Core (2015) has the
advantage that it allows them to provide a dollar measure of the risk-taking incentives
stemming from the limited liability of equity. However, their approach has the drawback
that, on top of the well-known problems of using the market value of options as a measure
of CEOs’ expected utility (Lambert et al., 1991; Ross, 2004; Ingersoll, 2006; Lewellen,
2006), obtaining the value of equity as a call option on firm value requires making very
strong assumptions about, among other things, banks’ capital structure, the tradeability of
assets, or the stochastic properties of the value of banks’ assets (Nagel and Purnanandam,
2015). These strong assumptions, together with the approximations made to measure the
variables in the theoretical model, imply that the quantitative measures of risk-taking
incentives derived from these models are likely to exhibit a large measurement error, es-
pecially given that the incentive measures are highly nonlinear in their arguments.54 We
believe that the valuation approach of Chesney et al. (2012) and Anderson and Core (2015)
and our reduced-form approach are complementary.
53 We note that Guay (1999) proposes an approximation to the sensitivity of equity value
to volatility and finds that this sensitivity is generally very small for a sample of U.S.
CEOs in 1993, consistently with a generally small leverage in that sample.
54 We note that the computation of delta relies on minimal assumptions about the valu-
ation of stock options and that, in fact, a large component of delta, consists simply of the
market value of the CEO’s stock holdings, as one can see in expression (1).
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7. Conclusion
Increasing the exposure of a risk-averse, undiversified CEO to his firm’s stock price may
provide the CEO incentives to reduce the firm’s risk. However, in highly levered firms,
shareholders have strong incentives to shift risk to debtholders. Therefore, in these firms,
a greater exposure to the firm’s stock price, by aligning the CEO’s incentives with those
of shareholders, may increase the CEO’s risk-taking incentives.
Using a sample of large U.S. financial firms we find support for this hypothesis: A
higher pre-crisis sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price (delta) is associated with a
significantly (quantitatively and statistically) higher probability of failure during the 2007-
2010 financial crisis in highly levered firms. However, a higher delta is not associated with
a higher probability of failure in firms with relatively low leverage.
We make several contributions to the debate about the relation between executive
compensation and risk in financial firms. First, we show that the risk-taking incentives
generated by CEOs’ stock and option compensation are associated with risk in financial
firms, in contrast with some of the results in previous literature. Second, we provide
evidence that the relevant source of risk-taking incentives for the CEOs of large financial
firms prior to the crisis was their exposure to their firms’ stock returns. We find no evidence
that the incentives to increase stock return volatility that may have been created by CEOs’
stock option holdings were associated with a higher probability of failure. Therefore, our
results suggest that the stronger risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of some financial firms
were not the result of a misalignment between CEOs’ and shareholders’ incentives in those
firms. Instead, a better alignment between CEOs’ and shareholder incentives seems to
have encouraged CEOs to shift risk to debtholders and depositors. Our results also have
the implication that banking supervisors should consider compensation arrangements in
relation to leverage when they evaluate the risk-taking incentives created by executive
compensation. Finally, by establishing a link between CEO compensation and risk in
financial firms, our results suggest that regulating CEO compensation in financial firms
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The following table lists the institutions included in the sample in year 2006. Firms are
listed in three groups, according to the criterion used to include them in the sample. Firms
in Group A are firms that are selected because their SIC code is one of the following:
602 (Commercial Banks), 603 (Savings Institutions), or 6712 (Offices of Bank Holding
Companies). Firms in Group B are firms that do not meet the SIC code criterion, but
are included in the sample because they are identified as a regulated institution by the
National Information Center of the FFIEC (http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/
SearchForm.aspx.), which implies that the firm controls depository institutions (such as
banks or savings and loan associations). Finally, firms in Group C are firms that do not
meet the above two criteria, but are included in the sample because of their primary dealer
status as of December 2006.
Group A) Firms selected by industry code
ANCHOR BANCORP WISCONSIN INC GUARANTY FINANCIAL GROUP INC WACHOVIA CORP
ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP HANMI FINANCIAL CORP WASHINGTON FEDERAL INC
BANCORPSOUTH INC HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC
BANK MUTUAL CORP HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP
BANK OF AMERICA CORP INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MI WELLS FARGO & CO
BANK OF HAWAII CORP INDYMAC BANCORP INC WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP WHITNEY HOLDING CORP
BANK OF THE OZARKS INC JPMORGAN CHASE & CO WILMINGTON TRUST CORP
BANKUNITED FINANCIAL CORP KEYCORP WILSHIRE BANCORP INC
BB&T CORP M & T BANK CORP WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP
BBCN BANCORP INC MAF BANCORP INC ZIONS BANCORPORATION
BBX CAPITAL CORP MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP
BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HOLDINGS MELLON FINANCIAL CORP
BROOKLINE BANCORP INC MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORP Group B) Firms selected by entity type
CASCADE BANCORP N B T BANCORP INC AMERICAN EXPRESS CO
CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP NATIONAL CITY CORP AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC
CENTER FINANCIAL CORP NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES INC ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP
CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL CP NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC BBVA COMPASS BANCSHARES INC
CHITTENDEN CORP NORTHERN TRUST CORP CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP
CITIGROUP INC OLD NATIONAL BANCORP COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC
CITY HOLDING CO PACWEST BANCORP COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP
CITY NATIONAL CORP PEOPLE’S UNITED FINL INC E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP
COLONIAL BANCGROUP PINNACLE FINL PARTNERS INC FIFTH THIRD BANCORP
COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM INC PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC FRANKLIN BANK CORP
COMERICA INC PRIVATEBANCORP INC FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC
COMMERCE BANCORP INC/NJ PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC INVESTORS FINANCIAL SVCS CP
COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC
CORUS BANKSHARES INC REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP MORGAN STANLEY
CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC S & T BANCORP INC MUFG AMERICAS HOLDINGS CORP
DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES SANTANDER HOLDINGS USA INC POPULAR INC
DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP SIMMONS FIRST NATL CP -CL A PRICE (T. ROWE) GROUP
EAST WEST BANCORP INC SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GRP INC
FIRST BANCORP P R STATE STREET CORP RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL CORP
FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL CP/PA STERLING BANCORP/NY -OLD SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP
FIRST FINL BANCORP INC/OH STERLING BANCSHARES INC/TX SEI INVESTMENTS CO
FIRST FINL BANKSHARES INC STERLING FINANCIAL CORP/WA SWS GROUP INC
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP SUNTRUST BANKS INC TOMPKINS FINANCIAL CORP
FIRST INDIANA CORP SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC U S BANCORP
FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC SVB FINANCIAL GROUP
FIRST NIAGARA FINANCIAL GRP SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP Group C) Primary dealers only
FIRST REPUBLIC BANK TCF FINANCIAL CORP BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC
FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP/CA TD BANKNORTH INC GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC
FIRSTMERIT CORP TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC
FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC UCBH HOLDINGS INC
FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORP/WA UMB FINANCIAL CORP
FULTON FINANCIAL CORP UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP
GLACIER BANCORP INC UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV
GREATER BAY BANCORP UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS INC
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2. Failed firms
The following table lists the institutions that we identify as failed in the period 2007–2010.
Columns Year and Month display the last year and month, respectively, for which there is
information for the corresponding firm in CRSP. The column Step displays at which step
in the procedure to identify failed firms the firm was categorized as failed. The four steps
of the procedure to identify failed firms, described in Section 4.1, are: 1) bank subsidiary
closure (as identified by the FDIC); 2) merger discount; 3) PROQUEST keyword search;
4) Internet search.
Company Name Year Month Step
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 2008 5 2
COLONIAL BANCGROUP 2009 7 1
CORUS BANKSHARES INC 2009 8 1
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP 2008 6 2
DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 2008 10 1
FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP 2009 2 1
FRANKLIN BANKCORP 2008 10 1
FRONTIER FINANCIAL CORP/WA 2010 4 1
INDYMAC BANCORP INC 2008 6 1
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP 2009 8 1
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 2008 8 3
MELLON FINANCIAL CORP 2007 6 2
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 2008 12 4
NATIONAL CITY CORP 2008 12 4
PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 2009 4 4
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC 2010 9 2
UCBH HOLDINGS INC 2009 10 1
WACHOVIA CORP 2008 12 2
WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 2008 8 1
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3. Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Main Variables in Year 2006.
The table reports summary statistics for the firms in the sample. S.d. denotes the standard
deviation and p-n denotes the nth percentile. Delta is the change in the value of the CEO’s
portfolio of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the
price of the stock of the firm. Vega is the change in the value of the CEO’s option portfolio
(measured in $ million) associated with a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation of the
price of the stock. Total pay is the total compensation received by the CEO. It comprises
salary, bonus, other annual payments, restricted stock grants, long term incentive plan
(LTIP) payouts, other compensation, and the value of option grants. Leverage is the quasi-
market value of leverage, computed as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus
market value of equity, divided by market value of equity. Market cap. is the firm’s market
capitalization. Market capitalization and total assets are measured in billions of dollars.
Total Assets is the total assets of the firm as of December 2006 measured in billion dollars.
ROA (avg.) is the average return on assets over the period 2004–2006, where return on
assets is measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation over total assets at
the end of the previous year. Market-to-book is the equity market-to-book ratio, defined as
market capitalization over the book value of equity. Returns (avg.) is the average annual
stock return in the period 2004–2006. All variables are measured in year 2006 except
otherwise noted.
Count Mean S.d. p-10 p-25 p-50 p-75 p-90
Delta 129 1.34 4.25 0.03 0.09 0.35 1.13 2.93
Vega 129 0.27 0.49 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.34 0.80
Total pay 127 6.95 10.28 0.67 1.09 2.23 7.45 20.37
Leverage 129 6.24 2.88 3.81 4.77 5.63 6.97 9.33
Market cap. 129 16.04 39.39 0.62 1.11 2.15 12.03 31.49
Total assets 129 104.70 284.23 2.66 5.49 11.12 52.62 199.95
ROA (avg.) 129 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
Market-to-book 129 2.25 1.08 1.37 1.61 2.01 2.50 3.37
Returns (avg.) 129 0.12 0.11 −0.02 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.25
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Table 2: Risk-taking incentives and bank failure. The table presents
estimated coefficients of different specifications of a linear probability model with Failed
as the dependent variable. Failed is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm fails in the
period from 2007 to 2010. Delta is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value
of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 1%
change in the price of the stock of the firm. Vega is the natural logarithm of one plus the
change in the value of the CEO’s option portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with
a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation of the price of the stock. Leverage is the quasi-
market value of leverage, computed as book value of assets minus book value of equity
plus market value of equity, divided by market value of equity. Firm size is the natural
logarithm of total assets. G. parachute and Severance pay are the contingent payments
upon termination with and without a change in control, respectively, as in year 2006’s
proxy statements. Inside debt is the sum of the present value of accumulated pension
benefits from all pension plans and the total aggregate balance in deferred compensation
plans of the CEO at the end of 2006, as reported in ExecuComp. CEO wealth is the
non-firm wealth of the CEO, as defined by Dittmann and Maug (2007). All compensation
variables are logarithmic transformations of the original variables measured in millions of
dollars. CEO age denotes the CEO’s age in years. E-index is the Entrenchment Index,
as defined by Bebchuck et al. (2009). Board size is the number of members of the board
of directors. Independence is the number of independent directors divided by board size.
Tenure co. measures the number of years the CEO has been employed at the company
(irrespectively of his position). CEO Tenure measures the number of years the CEO has
been in office. Number boards denotes the number of boards of listed firms at which the
CEO has ever served, as reported by BoardEx. Duality is a dummy equal to one if the CEO
also serves as Chairman of the board. Percent new denotes the fraction of independent
directors appointed after the CEO was hired. Blockholder own. denotes the percentage
of ownership in the hands of institutional blockholders (with at least 5% of the shares).
Employees is the number of employees in thousands. Complexity is a dummy variable equal
to one if the Federal Reserve considers the firm a complex institution. International is a
dummy variable equal to one if the firm has operations outside the U.S.. Multiple banks
is a dummy equal to one if the firm controls more than one commercial bank. *, ** and
*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Failed avg. is the
average of the variable Failed (i.e., the unconditional probability of failure) in the sample
used in the corresponding column. 75− 25 (Lev. L) is the average difference between the
predicted probability of failure if delta is at its 75th percentile and leverage is at its Lth
percentile and the predicted probability of failure if delta is at its 25th percentile and
leverage is at its Lth percentile.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delta 0.130 −0.052 −0.322∗∗∗ −0.200∗ −0.029 −0.122 −0.524∗∗∗ −0.122
(0.089) (0.081) (0.100) (0.103) (0.116) (0.097) (0.188) (0.110)
Delta × Leverage 0.027∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.028) (0.027) (0.013) (0.012) (0.030) (0.011)
Vega −0.097 0.059 −0.025 −0.048 0.138 0.023 −0.069 0.019
(0.214) (0.183) (0.222) (0.194) (0.198) (0.207) (0.182) (0.184)
Leverage 0.013 −0.011 0.000 0.019 0.003 −0.028∗ 0.002
(0.020) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018)
Firm size 0.028 −0.013 0.005 −0.019 −0.017 0.003 −0.044 0.007
(0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.032) (0.026) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
Total pay 0.010 −0.010 0.010
(0.104) (0.079) (0.087)




















Board size −0.001 0.002
(0.016) (0.012)














Obs. 129 129 98 118 110 93 94 110
Adj. R2 0.041 0.138 0.092 0.096 0.166 0.103 0.160 0.191
Failed avg. 0.147 0.147 0.143 0.144 0.136 0.172 0.117 0.155
75− 25 (Lev. 25) 0.087 0.052 0.025 0.085 0.056 0.011 0.045 0.023
75− 25 (Lev. 75) 0.087 0.092 0.135 0.185 0.091 0.053 0.226 0.070
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Table 3: Subsectors. The table presents estimated coefficients of different specifi-
cations of a linear probability model with Failed as the dependent variable. Failed is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010. Columns (1)
and (2) include dummies for each of the existing subsectors in the sample (commercial
banks (SIC codes 602 and 6199), savings institutions (603), personal credit institutions
(6141), mortgage bankers and loan correspondents (6162), security brokers and dealers
(6211), and investment advice (6282)). In columns (3) and (4), investments banks are ex-
cluded from the sample. The sample in column (5) contains only Bank Holding Companies
(BHCs). Delta is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value of the CEO’s
portfolio of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the
price of the stock of the firm. Vega is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the
value of the CEO’s option portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a change of
0.01 in the standard deviation of the price of the stock. Firm size is the natural logarithm
of total assets. Leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage, computed as book value of
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by market value of
equity. The specifications with controls include as controls: the natural logarithm of (one
plus) total pay, the CEO tenure at the company, board size, the fraction of the shares
owned by institutional blockholders, and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has
operations outside the U.S.. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Obs. stands for the
number of observations. Failed avg. is the average of the variable Failed (i.e., the uncon-
ditional probability of failure) in the sample used in the corresponding column. 75− 25
(Lev. L) is the average difference between the predicted probability of failure if delta is
at its 75th percentile and leverage is at its Lth percentile and the predicted probability of
failure if delta is at its 25th percentile and leverage is at its Lth percentile.
Subsector dummies No inv. banks BHCs only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Delta −0.005 −0.062 −0.379 −0.579∗∗ −0.754∗∗
(0.110) (0.134) (0.239) (0.235) (0.298)
Leverage 0.007 −0.000 −0.003 −0.025 −0.028∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017)
Delta × Leverage 0.025∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.040) (0.036) (0.042)
Vega −0.087 −0.147 0.038 −0.042 −0.063
(0.201) (0.244) (0.197) (0.229) (0.291)
Firm size 0.003 −0.001 −0.007 −0.007 −0.078
(0.025) (0.041) (0.030) (0.049) (0.048)
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Subsector dummies Yes Yes No No No
Obs. 129 110 115 96 79
Adj. R2 0.179 0.207 0.085 0.162 0.184
Failed avg. 0.147 0.155 0.139 0.146 0.127
75− 25 (Lev. 25) 0.077 0.056 0.010 −0.036 −0.012
75− 25 (Lev. 75) 0.113 0.102 0.131 0.125 0.212
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Table 4: TBTF banks. The table presents estimated coefficients of different spec-
ifications of a linear probability model with Failed as the dependent variable. Failed is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010. Columns (1)
and (2) include the dummy variable TBTF-CAP, which is equal to one for firms larger
than the smallest firm (in terms of total assets as of 2006) included in the 2009 SCAP.
Columns (3) and (4) include the dummy variable TBTF-rev., which is equal to one for
firms larger than the largest firm (in terms of total assets as of 2006) with Failed = 1. In
columns 5 to 8, the sample consists of Bank Holding Companies only. Delta is the natural
logarithm of one plus the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and options
(measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the price of the stock of the firm.
Vega is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value of the CEO’s option
portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation
of the price of the stock. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the
quasi-market value of leverage, computed as book value of assets minus book value of eq-
uity plus market value of equity, divided by market value of equity. The specifications with
controls include as controls: the natural logarithm of (one plus) total pay, the CEO tenure
at the company, board size, the fraction of the shares owned by institutional blockholders,
and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has operations outside the U.S.. *, ** and
*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Failed avg. is the
average of the variable Failed (i.e., the unconditional probability of failure) in the sample
used in the corresponding column. 75− 25 (Lev. L) is the average difference between the
predicted probability of failure if delta is at its 75th percentile and leverage is at its Lth
percentile and the predicted probability of failure if delta is at its 25th percentile and
leverage is at its Lth percentile.
All firms BHCs only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delta −0.054 −0.128 −0.056 −0.101 −0.432∗∗ −0.578∗∗∗ −0.543∗∗∗ −0.612∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.114) (0.086) (0.112) (0.188) (0.182) (0.189) (0.184)
Leverage 0.013 0.001 0.012 0.001 −0.021 −0.023 −0.027∗ −0.025∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
Delta × Leverage 0.028∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027)
Vega 0.072 0.050 0.011 −0.034 −0.045 −0.045 −0.204 −0.304
(0.184) (0.175) (0.179) (0.181) (0.186) (0.181) (0.191) (0.216)
TBTF-CAP −0.021 −0.055 −0.025 −0.132
(0.111) (0.146) (0.144) (0.178)
Firm size −0.011 0.012 0.013 0.038 −0.012 −0.068∗ 0.034 −0.024
(0.030) (0.036) (0.028) (0.042) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.045)
TBTF-rev. −0.431∗∗∗ −0.417∗∗∗ −0.574∗∗∗ −0.571∗∗
(0.126) (0.139) (0.190) (0.222)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 129 110 129 110 94 81 94 81
Adj. R2 0.131 0.184 0.167 0.221 0.112 0.172 0.177 0.234
Failed avg. 0.147 0.155 0.147 0.155 0.117 0.123 0.117 0.123
75− 25 (Lev. 25) 0.052 0.021 0.051 0.035 0.050 0.037 0.044 0.056
75− 25 (Lev. 75) 0.092 0.070 0.092 0.082 0.206 0.231 0.230 0.269
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Table 5: Alternative specifications. The table presents estimated coefficients
of different specifications with Failed as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 report
coefficients of a linear probability model. Columns 3 and 4 report coefficients of a probit
model. Columns 5 and 6 report coefficients of a logit model. Failed is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010. Delta is the change in the value
of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 1%
change in the price of the stock of the firm. Vega is the change in the value of the CEO’s
option portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a change of 0.01 in the standard
deviation of the price of the stock. In all specifications, Delta, Vega, and total pay enter
linearly (instead of as logarithmic transformations). Leverage is the quasi-market value of
leverage, computed as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value
of equity, divided by market value of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total
assets. The specifications with controls include as controls: total pay, the CEO tenure at
the company, board size, the fraction of the shares owned by institutional blockholders,
and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has operations outside the U.S.. *, ** and
*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Failed avg. is the
average of the variable Failed (i.e., the unconditional probability of failure) in the sample
used in the corresponding column. 75− 25 (Lev. L) is the average difference between the
predicted probability of failure if delta is at its 75th percentile and leverage is at its Lth
percentile and the predicted probability of failure if delta is at its 25th percentile and
leverage is at its Lth percentile.
Linear Model Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delta(lin.) −0.009 −0.027 −0.424 −0.566 −0.766 −0.980
(0.017) (0.022) (0.336) (0.396) (0.644) (0.808)
Leverage 0.024 0.015 0.038 −0.018 0.059 −0.023
(0.019) (0.019) (0.068) (0.064) (0.115) (0.108)
Delta(lin.) × Leverage 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.091∗ 0.118∗ 0.164∗ 0.219∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.047) (0.066) (0.094) (0.133)
Vega (lin.) 0.084 0.033 0.258 0.116 0.536 0.206
(0.113) (0.111) (0.526) (0.566) (0.923) (1.057)
Firm size −0.008 −0.003 −0.074 0.036 −0.152 0.119
(0.025) (0.038) (0.109) (0.178) (0.195) (0.363)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 129 110 129 110 129 110
Adj. R2 0.121 0.177
Pseudo-R2 0.185 0.285 0.183 0.286
Failed avg. 0.147 0.155 0.145 0.152 0.147 0.155
75− 25 (Lev. 25) 0.016 −0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.001 0.006
75− 25 (Lev. 75) 0.028 0.011 0.044 0.048 0.042 0.054
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Table 6: Pre-crisis performance. The table presents estimated coefficients of
different specifications of a linear probability model with Failed as the dependent variable.
Failed is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm fails in the period from 2007 to 2010.
Delta is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio
of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the price of
the stock of the firm. Vega is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value of
the CEO’s option portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a change of 0.01 in the
standard deviation of the price of the stock. Leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage,
computed as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity,
divided by market value of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA
(avg.) is the average return on assets over the period from 2004 to 2006, where return on
assets is measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation over total assets at
the end of the previous year. Market-to-book is the equity market-to-book ratio, defined as
market capitalization over the book value of equity. Returns (avg.) is the average annual
stock return in the period from 2004 to 2006. The specifications with controls include as
controls: the natural logarithm of (one plus) total pay, the CEO tenure at the company,
board size, the fraction of the shares owned by institutional blockholders, and a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm has operations outside the U.S.. *, ** and *** represent
significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Dep. var. avg. is the average
of the dependent variable in the sample used in the corresponding column. 75− 25 (Lev.
L) is the average difference between the predicted probability of failure if delta is at its
75th percentile and leverage is at its Lth percentile and the predicted probability of failure
if delta is at its 25th percentile and leverage is at its Lth percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delta −0.034 −0.100 −0.048 −0.128 −0.025 −0.072
(0.127) (0.153) (0.126) (0.152) (0.147) (0.162)
Leverage 0.024 0.010 0.016 0.001 0.009 −0.005
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Delta × Leverage 0.022∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Vega 0.018 −0.002 0.064 0.002 0.020 −0.049
(0.212) (0.223) (0.204) (0.222) (0.205) (0.222)
Firm size −0.019 0.008 −0.012 0.006 −0.010 −0.005
(0.027) (0.046) (0.028) (0.050) (0.027) (0.048)
ROA (avg.) 6.057∗ 3.900
(3.548) (3.684)




Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 125 106 125 106 125 106
Adj. R2 0.157 0.188 0.129 0.177 0.132 0.189
Failed avg. 0.152 0.160 0.152 0.160 0.152 0.160
75− 25 (Lev. 25) 0.047 0.026 0.049 0.020 0.067 0.047
75− 25 (Lev. 75) 0.080 0.069 0.086 0.068 0.106 0.091
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Table 7: Alternative risk measures: DD and EDF. The table presents
estimated coefficients of OLS regressions (columns 1 and 2) and Tobit regressions (columns
3 and 4). In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the average, adjusted for attrition
as described in the text, over the period from 2007 to 2010 of DD (distance to default), as
defined by Bharath and Shumway (2008). In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is
the average, adjusted for attrition as described in the text, over the period from 2007 to
2010 of EDF (expected default frequency), defined as Φ(−DD), where Φ is the standard
normal distribution function. Delta is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the
value of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with
a 1% change in the price of the stock of the firm. Vega is the natural logarithm of one plus
the change in the value of the CEO’s option portfolio (measured in $ million) associated
with a change of 0.01 in the standard deviation of the price of the stock. Firm size is the
natural logarithm of total assets, Leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage, computed
as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by
market value of equity. The specifications with controls include as controls: the natural
logarithm of (one plus) total pay, the CEO tenure at the company, board size, the fraction
of the shares owned by institutional blockholders, and a dummy variable equal to one if
the firm has operations outside the U.S.. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Obs. stands
for the number of observations. Dep. var. avg. is the average of the dependent variable in
the sample used in the corresponding column. 75− 25 (Lev. L) is the average difference
between the predicted value of the dependent variable if delta is at its 75th percentile and
leverage is at its Lth percentile and the predicted value of the dependent variable if delta
is at its 25th percentile and leverage is at its Lth percentile.
DD EDF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delta 3.963∗∗∗ 3.674∗∗∗ −0.392∗∗∗ −0.430∗∗∗
(1.032) (0.996) (0.077) (0.108)
Leverage −0.099 −0.047 0.013 0.004
(0.107) (0.081) (0.012) (0.011)
Delta × Leverage −0.313∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.088) (0.016) (0.019)
Vega −3.193∗∗∗ −3.358∗∗∗ 0.094 −0.006
(1.217) (1.246) (0.133) (0.131)
Firm size 0.021 −0.703∗∗ 0.015 0.033
(0.168) (0.284) (0.020) (0.034)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Obs. 117 102 119 103
Adj. R2 0.363 0.422
Pseudo-R2 0.418 0.514
Dep. var. avg. 0.145 0.161 0.834 0.851
75− 25 (Lev. 25) 1.644 1.443 −0.128 −0.112
75− 25 (Lev. 75) 1.188 0.982 −0.067 −0.032
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Table 8: Alternative risk measures: measures based on market
returns. The table presents estimated coefficients of OLS regressions, except for column
4, which reports estimated coefficients of a Tobit model. In column 1, the dependent
variable is stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over
the period from 07/01/2007 to 12/31/2008, for firms with at least 60 days of trading.
In column 2, the dependent variable is the market beta measured over the period from
07/01/2007 to 12/31/2008. To measure beta we use the CRSP value-weighted index return,
including dividends, as the market return. In columns 3 to 5, the dependent variable (BHR)
is the buy-and-hold returns from 07/01/2007 to 12/31/2008. In column 4, buy-and-hold
returns of failed firms are converted to −1 and the coefficients are the estimated coefficients
of a Tobit model. In column 5, only Bank Holding Companies are included in the sample.
Delta is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value of the CEO’s portfolio
of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the price of
the stock of the firm. Vega is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value
of the CEO’s option portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a change of 0.01
in the standard deviation of the price of the stock. Leverage is the quasi-market value of
leverage, computed as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value
of equity, divided by market value of equity. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total
assets. The controls are: the natural logarithm of (one plus) total pay, the CEO tenure at
the company, board size, the fraction of the shares owned by institutional blockholders,
and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has operations outside the U.S.. *, ** and
*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Dep. var. avg.
is the average of the dependent variable in the sample used in the corresponding column.
75− 25 (Lev. L) is the average difference between the predicted value of the dependent
variable if delta is at its 75th percentile and leverage is at its Lth percentile and the
predicted value of the dependent variable if delta is at its 25th percentile and leverage is
at its Lth percentile.
Volatility Beta BHR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Delta −0.047 −0.106 −0.021 0.238 0.573∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.108) (0.123) (0.170) (0.144)
Leverage 0.023 0.024 −0.001 0.018 0.046∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.029) (0.027) (0.016)
Delta × Leverage 0.013 0.020∗ −0.010 −0.074∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.035) (0.029)
Vega −0.025 0.023 0.318∗ 0.485∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.228) (0.164) (0.194) (0.150)
Firm size 0.058∗ 0.015 −0.141∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗ −0.111∗∗
(0.033) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.042)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 103 103 107 108 79
Adj. R2 0.367 0.563 0.297 0.296
Pseudo-R2 0.333
Dep. var. avg. 0.820 1.473 −0.402 −0.482 −0.346
75− 25 (Lev. 25) 0.010 −0.007 −0.047 −0.077 0.035
75− 25 (Lev. 75) 0.030 0.023 −0.062 −0.185 −0.125
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Table 9: Incentives and risk before and after the crisis. The table
presents estimated coefficients of OLS regressions. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent
variable is the average over the period from 2003 to 2006 of DD (distance to default),
as defined by Bharath and Shumway (2008). In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable
is the average over the period from 2003 to 2006 of EDF (expected default frequency),
defined as Φ(−DD), where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. In columns 5
and 6, the dependent variable is the average over the period from 2011 to 2014 of DD. In
columns 7 and 8, the dependent variable is the average over the period from 2011 to 2014
of EDF. Delta is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value of the CEO’s
portfolio of stock and options (measured in $ million) associated with a 1% change in the
price of the stock of the firm. Vega is the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the
value of the CEO’s option portfolio (measured in $ million) associated with a change of
0.01 in the standard deviation of the price of the stock. Firm size is the natural logarithm
of total assets, Leverage is the quasi-market value of leverage, computed as book value of
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by market value of
equity. The specifications with controls include as controls: the natural logarithm of (one
plus) total pay, the CEO tenure at the company, board size, the fraction of the shares
owned by institutional blockholders, and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has
operations outside the U.S.. All independent variables in columns (1) to (4) are measured
in 2002. All independent variables in columns (5) to (8) are measured in 2010. *, ** and
*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Dep. var. avg.
is the average of the dependent variable in the sample used in the corresponding column.
75− 25 (Lev. L) is the average difference between the predicted value of the dependent
variable if delta is at its 75th percentile and leverage is at its Lth percentile and the
predicted value of the dependent variable if delta is at its 25th percentile and leverage is
at its Lth percentile.
2003–2006 2011–2014
DD EDF DD EDF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delta 4.045∗∗∗ 3.661∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.023 2.599 6.585∗∗ −0.024 −0.120∗∗∗
(1.284) (1.284) (0.013) (0.014) (1.974) (2.520) (0.056) (0.042)
Leverage 0.111 0.022 0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.025∗∗ 0.002 0.002∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.176) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000)
Delta × Leverage −0.268∗∗ −0.114 −0.002 0.001 −0.102 −0.623∗∗ 0.001 0.011∗
(0.121) (0.135) (0.002) (0.002) (0.083) (0.256) (0.004) (0.005)
Vega −3.075 −0.102 −0.019 −0.014 0.602 −0.673 −0.143∗∗ −0.097∗
(2.041) (2.423) (0.037) (0.038) (2.017) (1.807) (0.063) (0.056)
Firm size 0.177 −0.586 −0.005 −0.010 −0.105 −0.106 0.024∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.544) (0.731) (0.008) (0.010) (0.136) (0.158) (0.006) (0.010)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 107 74 107 74 121 93 121 93
Adj. R2 0.318 0.471 0.002 −0.044 0.078 0.321 0.154 0.161
Dep. var. avg. 3.868 3.975 0.036 0.032 2.970 3.036 0.162 0.153
75− 25 (Lev. 25) 1.598 1.832 −0.002 −0.010 0.569 0.711 −0.005 −0.014
75− 25 (Lev. 75) 1.034 1.591 −0.005 −0.008 0.414 −0.241 −0.004 0.003
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4. Figures
(a) Firm A: Low Leverage
(b) Firm B: High Leverage
Fig. 1: Leverage and Risk-Taking Incentives. The figures depict the relation
between the value of the firm (X) and the payoff (P ) to an equity holder for two different
firms (A and B), which differ only in the face value of their debt (D). Firm B in Panel





). We assume that firms are liquidated at debt maturity after the
debt is repaid, so P can be understood as shareholders’ liquidating dividend. In both
figures, the thick line represents the payoff to equity holders at debt maturity (P ) as a
function of the value of the firm (X). The current firm value for either firm is X0 and
either firm may undertake one of two projects, safe (s) or risky (r). The value of the
firm at debt maturity is assumed to be either X0 − k, with probability 1/2, or X0 + k,
with probability 1/2, where k = s for project s, k = r for project r, and r > s. Thus, the
distribution of firm value under project r is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution
under project r. P0 = X0 −D denotes the value of the firm’s equity if firm value were X0 at
debt maturity. For firm A in Panel (a) the expected equity value upon liquidation is the
same for both projects: Es(P ) =
1
2
(P0 − s) + 12 (P0 + s) = P0 = 12 (P0 − r) + 12 (P0 + r) =
Er(P ). For firm B in Panel (b), equity value is zero if the project returns are negative.
Therefore: Es(P ) =
1
2
(P0 + s) <
1
2
(P0 + r) = Er(P ).
